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Abstract 
Using 102 sovereigns rated by the three largest credit rating agencies (CRA), S&P, Moody’s and 
Fitch between January 2000 and January 2019, we are the first to document that the first mover 
CRA (S&P) in downgrades falls into a commercial trap. Namely, each first-mover downgrade by 
one notch by S&P results in a 2.4% increase in the probability of a rating contract being 
cancelled by the sovereign client, and a 1.2% decrease in the ratio of S&P’s sovereign rating 
coverage relative to Moody’s. The more first-mover downgrades S&P makes, the more their 
sovereign rating coverage declines relative to Moody’s. This paper interrelates three themes of 
the literature: herding behaviour amongst CRAs, issues of conflict of interest and ratings quality. 
Keywords: Sovereign credit ratings, herding behaviour, conflict of interest 
JEL classification: G15, G24 
  
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction and setting of the paper ................................................................................. 1 
2. Literature review ................................................................................................................. 5 
3. Data and Methodology ........................................................................................................ 8 
3.1 Sample selection .......................................................................................................... 8 
3.2 The multivariate analysis of lead-lag relationship ...................................................... 12 
3.3 The multivariate analysis of commercial trap hypothesis .......................................... 13 
4. Empirical Results ............................................................................................................... 15 
4.1 Lead-lag relationship in sovereign rating changes ..................................................... 15 
4.2 The Cox proportional hazard model .......................................................................... 23 
4.3 Commercial trap analyses .......................................................................................... 25 
5. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 33 
References ................................................................................................................................ 35 
Appendix ................................................................................................................................... 39 
 
List of Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Who moves first? All rating events ............................................................................ 10 
Figure 2. Who moves first when creditworthiness improves? ................................................. 10 
Figure 3. Who moves first when creditworthiness deteriorates? ............................................ 11 
Figure 4. Typically it takes less than a year to follow the leader(median days) ........................ 11 
Figure 5. Leadership Index (1= first mover in all episodes, 3= third mover in all episodes, number 
of episodes in parentheses) ...................................................................................................... 22 
 
Table 1. Who moves first? ........................................................................................................ 17 
Table 2. Leadership Index under different timespans between first and last mover ............... 20 
Table 3. Rising Stars and Fallen Angels ..................................................................................... 22 
Table 4. Cox Proportional Hazard Models – Eq. (1) .................................................................. 24 
Table 5. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis – Eq. (2) ............................................................. 25 
Table 6. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis – Eq. (2)- Regional breakdown .......................... 26 
Table 7. Summary statistics of S&P’s relative sovereign rating coverage, market share and 
downgrade intensity ................................................................................................................. 27 
Table 8. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis – Eq. (3) ............................................................. 28 
Table 9. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis– Eq. (3) - Small Borrowers ................................. 29 
Table 10. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis- – Eq. (3) - Large Borrowers ............................. 30 
Table 11. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis – Eq. (4) ........................................................... 31 
Table 12. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis- Eq. (4) - Small Borrowers ................................ 32 
Table 13. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis- Eq. (4) - Large Borrowers................................ 33 
Table A 1. Episodes of rating trend reversals............................................................................ 39 
Table A 2. Episodes of Rising Stars and Fallen Angels ............................................................... 44 
 
 | 1 
First-mover disadvantage: 
The sovereign ratings mousetrap 
Moritz Kramer, Patrycja Klusak and Huong Vu 
CEPS Working Document No 2020/02, February 2020 
1. Introduction and setting of the paper 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are expected to provide impartial independent ratings of the 
capacity and willingness of an issuer to honour its debts with private creditors (ESMA, 2017; 
SEC, 2013). Sovereign credit ratings can determine countries’ access to capital (Almeida et al., 
2017; Cornagia et al., 2017) and shape economic growth prospects (Chen et al., 2016). 
Unfavourable sovereign ratings can correlate with rising costs of credit and hindered market 
access (Brunnermeier et al., 2016). As observed during the recent European sovereign debt 
crisis, sovereign rating downgrades can spill over to other asset classes and economically 
connected countries (Augustin et al., 2018; Baum et al., 2016). Therefore, understanding rating 
agencies’ reaction functions regarding sovereign ratings is insightful for ratings users such as 
investors, policymakers and academics alike. A firmer sense of which CRA tends to be leading 
in times of changing credit quality can allow investors to make better and faster decisions for 
themselves and their clients. But there is an additional, commercial aspect to keep in mind, 
which, in the absence of robust safeguards and supervision, might influence CRAs’ ratings 
behaviour. 
It is widely established in the literature that markets respond differently to ratings by different 
CRAs (e.g., Arezki et al., 2011; Bongaerts et al., 2012) and to different rating events (upgrades 
vs downgrades) (Abad et al., 2019; Baum et al., 2016; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010). The former is 
because CRAs use different methodologies and assumptions (Afonso et al., 2012; Altdörfer et 
al., 2019; Flynn and Ghent, 2017). For example, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) places more weight 
on short-term accuracy by releasing more outlooks than Moody’s and Fitch, while also rating 
‘through the cycle’ (e.g. Bonsall et al., 2018; Cheng and Neamtiu, 2009). These differences in 
methodologies along with opaqueness of issuers often lead to differences (in sovereign ratings) 
across CRAs (Vu et al., 2017). The frequency of split ratings for sovereign debt has increased 
significantly since the crisis - especially for advanced economies - and is as common as split 
ratings once were for emerging economies (Amstad and Packer, 2015). The lead-lag literature 
suggests that S&P (Fitch) is considered the most (least) independent from the other agencies’ 
actions (Chen et al., 2019). Moody’s tends to move first for positive upgrades whereas S&P is 
the first mover on issuing downgrades (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010). Fitch’s ratings act as a 
‘tiebreaker’ for regulation classifying ratings into investment versus speculative grade when 
ratings by Moody’s and S&P are split (Bongaerts et al., 2012). Furthermore, it is established that 
markets are more sensitive to downgrades rather than upgrades. Downgrades generate more 
surprise in the market, negatively affecting the cost of capital (Afonso et al., 2012).  
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Contrary to popular belief, most sovereigns pay for ratings (i.e., solicited ratings; see S&P, 
2019a). While CRAs do not disclose financial results of individual business segments, such as 
sovereign ratings, the fact that most sovereign ratings are paid for would suggest that the 
sovereign business contributes positively to the bottom line of the CRAs, especially if one 
considers downstream business that results from the assignment of a sovereign rating. This can 
include state-owned companies or financial institutions, but also other ratings in a rated 
sovereign jurisdiction1 as well as supranationals whose creditworthiness depends partly on the 
financial promises made by member sovereigns (such as callable capital). CRAs typically do not 
issue corporate ratings or other ratings in a country if the corresponding sovereign is not rated 
first. Therefore, the commercial impact of sovereign ratings for CRAs can be much larger than 
the relatively small number of rated sovereigns (as compared, for example to corporates) 
would suggest. 
This can cause a dilemma for a CRA. While being the first mover on an upgrade cycle is typically 
met with applause by the affected government, the reaction can be quite adverse if a 
government is faced with a downgrade for the first time. In some cases, the government may 
decide to cancel the contract with the downgrading CRA (e.g., Turkey withdrew its contract 
with S&P in January 2013 after a series of downgrades).2 This has an immediate impact on the 
financial results of the CRA in question. In some cases, the CRA will react by withdrawing the 
rating at the issuer’s request after communicating the final downgrade decision to the market. 
Where it considers that sufficient market interest exists in a sovereign rating the CRA may 
choose to continue coverage in form of an unsolicited, i.e. non-fee paying, rating. It loses 
income either way. In the case of maintaining an unsolicited rating, the CRA has to additionally 
continue to mobilise the necessary staff and resources for full credit surveillance. 
In principle, none of this should affect the actual ratings that are issued. All CRAs insist that they 
keep commercial interest and analytical assessments separate, and supervisors continuously 
monitor that the corresponding walls of separation are effectively applied (S&P, 2018; MIS, 
2017). Since the financial crisis and the tightening regulation of the sector, those safeguards 
have been further strengthened (e.g., CRA Regulation in Europe).3  
Although CRAs maintain that their rating practices are independent and objective, and their 
processes seek to minimise conflicts of interest, there remains a risk that senior management’s 
financial aspirations cloud ratings analysts’ judgement, even if their own financial rewards do 
not formally depend on the ratings they assign. This risk may be less likely to come to the fore 
with seasoned analysts who have experienced several credit cycles and may feel more secure 
in their judgement and in some cases may worry less about their own job security. Clearly this 
 
1 Recall recent rating actions by Moody’s on 57 UK sub-sovereign entities and 39 special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 
following the change in the outlook to negative from stable on the UK’s Aa2 sovereign rating on 8 November 2019. 
SPVs related to sectors such as local authorities, universities, housing associations, public transit, public sector 
financing and non-profit organisations.  
2 S&P (2013). Republic of Turkey unsolicited issue ratings withdrawn. February 14, 2013. 
3 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit 
rating agencies. 
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remains an area of regulators’ attention as well as that of the CRAs’ own compliance 
departments, which further emphasises our contribution to the field.4 
The complexity of the issue is exacerbated by the fact that sovereign analysts may need to 
answer judicial questions when their ratings are not met with the satisfaction of the 
governments or regulators (i.e., this is when the ratings are “too low” at any point of time). For 
example, during the 2007 financial crisis, CRAs were criticised for not downgrading bonds fast 
enough and failing to issue timely warnings to investors before bonds defaulted. In other words, 
analysts in non-sovereign asset classes had to answer judicial questions why the rating was “too 
high” at a given point in time. On the contrary, during the recent European sovereign debt 
crisis, CRAs were criticised for being too strict when suddenly issuing a series of sovereign 
downgrades in Europe (EC, 2010; Hill and Faff, 2010). Therefore, sovereign analysts appear to 
have responded to the opposite accusation, i.e. having to justify why the rating was allegedly 
“too low”. For example, in 2012 sovereign analysts from S&P and Fitch were subject to 
prosecution for market manipulation in a criminal court in Italy following a series of downgrades 
of that country (Reuters, 2017). Although all accused were finally acquitted, the process took 
five years to conclude, which damaged the reputation of the analysts individually as well as the 
CRAs they represented. Whether this reflection makes sovereign analysts face different 
incentives than their colleagues rating bonds in other asset classes is not easily observable. 
However, it suggests special attention may need to be given to protecting the independence of 
sovereign analysts. All of the above might affect the analytical decision-making of individual 
sovereign analysts, perhaps leading them to be more cautious when considering a downgrade. 
Negative rating appraisals can have commercial implications for the CRA as issuers can ‘shop’ 
for the most favourable ratings (Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009). 
Analysts can come under immense pressure that may require a high degree of personal and 
professional resilience. CRAs need to choose whether to respond in a timely manner and to 
reflect the new information about the issue(r) (Berwart et al., 2016; Hill and Faff, 2010) at a 
cost of potentially losing a contract (if it is a negative assessment) or to rely on others being the 
leaders and perhaps those competitors losing their position in the market.  
S&P is considered the first mover, especially in downgrades (Flynn and Ghent, 2018; Güttler 
and Wahrenburg, 2007; Hill and Faff, 2010) and, contrary to its competitors, appears to have 
been particularly subject to sovereign clients cancelling their contracts after a first-mover 
downgrade. We observe this pattern in sovereigns as diverse as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Italy, 
Portugal, Isle of Man, Guernsey, Tunisia, and Gabon (the latter four were then withdrawn by 
S&P rather than surveyed on an unsolicited basis, although Guernsey was later reinstated upon 
signing of a new ratings agreement). This anecdotal examination seems to suggest that further 
research into this complex subject is warranted. We propose the hypothesis that the first-
mover advantage may lead to a commercial mouse trap: the first mouse gets squashed, while 
the second and third mouse share the cheese. Herein we aim to address the following question: 
 
4 See S&P (2018). “S&P Global Ratings Conflicts of Interest. Press Release” for steps taken to reduce conflict of 
interest via analyst rotation, securities ownership capping amongst others. 
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Does the first downgrade mover receive a penalty by losing the contract with the sovereign? It 
could be argued that, by releasing prompt downgrades, a CRA serves the needs of ratings users 
(investors) but potentially harms the interests of issuers since reduction in creditworthiness 
could mean higher costs of credit and reduced economic prospects as well as a perceived threat 
to the prestige of the sovereign’s political leaders. Adding to the severity is the fact that 
sovereign downgrades might result in downgrades of other asset classes domiciled in the 
country concerned (Hill et al., 2017). Therefore, sovereigns might choose to cancel their 
contracts following a downgrade. To test this prediction, we identify the ‘punishment’ as a 
withdrawal of a sovereign contract or switch to an unsolicited rating following the sovereign 
downgrade.5 Additionally, we examine the direct effect on CRAs’ sovereign rating coverage 
relative to the rival CRAs, hence revealing further insights into the potential impact on the first-
mover’s market power. 
Our research benefits from a rich dataset of daily ratings for 102 countries jointly rated by the 
three global CRAs, including S&P, Moody’s and Fitch during the period between 1 January 2000 
and 15 January 2019. Unlike the existing studies on the lead-lag relationship, we test the co-
dependency of the biggest three CRAs simultaneously rather than in pairs (e.g., Güttler and 
Wahrenburg, 2007). We do this by comparing only the episodes where all three CRAs have 
reflected a change in the trend of credit strength. By observing the direction of the rating 
changes (sovereign credit trend reversal) rather than simply their intensity, we are able to 
disentangle which CRA is the quickest to respond to the new information and incorporate it 
into the sovereign rating before it becomes a consensus view. In other words, we are able to 
deduce which rating action carries more information content, depending on whether it is 
leading or lagging rating actions by competitors. Additionally, by applying a rigorous 
identification strategy where, inter alia, the period between the first and the last mover does 
not exceed five years, we lower the possibility that a later rating action is a response to a 
different posterior development rather than a response to the same development that 
triggered the preceding rating action in the same direction by a competitor.  
Under our identification strategy, there are 55 episodes of triple downgrades. This means that 
in 55 cases all three major CRAs downgraded a given sovereign within five years, following 
stable ratings or upgrades in the five years prior to the beginning of this episode. We consider 
this situation as a negative credit trend reversal. During the same period of investigation, we 
account for 65 episodes of triple upgrades (positive credit trend reversals). Positive and 
negative trend reversals are observed for 73 sovereigns worldwide. This shows that a sovereign 
can be subject to several episodes of trend reversals during the 2000-2019 period. 
Our leadership index calculated on these episodes highlights S&P as the leader for both types 
of rating changes, particularly downgrades that cross the investment-speculative boundary 
(fallen angels). Moody’s and Fitch tend to follow S&P, with Moody’s being slower than Fitch in 
 
5 We have considered accounting for lawsuits filed against CRAs, however anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
only CRA of the big three ever charged was S&P. E.g. See US Department of Justice lawsuits against S&P in 2013 
for misleading analysis on the subprime mortgage sector in 2013 (Reuters, 2013). 
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catching up with S&P. We also find more supporting evidence for S&P’s leadership revealed by 
the semiparametric Cox proportional hazard model. S&P’s leadership persists over the years 
and dominates particularly in EMEA and Americas.   
Testing the commercial ‘mouse trap’ hypothesis is our significant and novel contribution to the 
literature since it focuses on the outcomes of the first-mover CRA rather than its followers (e.g., 
Chen et al., 2019; Lugo et al., 2015). Specifically, we investigate the impact of sovereign 
downgrades by S&P (the downgrade leader CRA in our data) on their future sovereign rating 
coverage and their probability of ratings contracts being withdrawn. We find that downgrades 
by the first-mover CRA, S&P in particular, not only raise the likelihood that sovereign clients 
terminate rating contracts within the next three years by 2.4% but also cause S&P’s sovereign 
rating coverage relative to Moody’s to decline by 1.2%. Both obtained results are statistically 
significant at 1% level and economically meaningful.  
Our work has implications for CRA regulators, policymakers and CRAs themselves. Considering 
the prominence of sovereign ratings in the political debate, risks faced by the sovereign analysts 
are arguably higher than for analysts of other asset classes. In order to uphold the integrity and 
relevance of the sovereign ratings process, every effort must be made to protect analysts from 
these potential non-analytical influences. First and foremost, this is the responsibility of the 
CRAs themselves. Analysts must remain effectively shielded from the commercial corporate 
interests of the CRA itself through robust, transparent and uncompromising compliance rules 
separating analytics from the business. Analysts must also feel secure in the understanding that 
by expressing their analytical opinions and voting accordingly in credit committees, they will 
not in any indirect way impact their own career or employment prospects at their firm. It falls 
with the purview of regulators to monitor the strict and unerring adherence to the letter and 
spirit of effective compliance arrangements and investigate to what extent organisational or 
staffing changes at CRAs might be an expression of a conflict of interest within the CRA. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a critical appraisal of the 
literature. Section 3 presents data and methodology. Section 4 summarises the empirical 
results and finally, Section 5 concludes the study. 
2. Literature review 
The topic of herding behaviour is an established and extensive area in finance literature. It has 
long been known that security analysts ‘herd’ when making stock recommendations (Barber et 
al., 2001; Chen et al., 2018; Clement et al., 2005; Cooper et al., 2001; Hong et al., 2000; 
Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010). Theoretical models by Banerjee (1992), Graham (2003), Scharfstein 
and Stein, (1990), and Trueman (1994) show that the decision to herd is influenced by the 
abilities, incentives and reputational considerations of analysts. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) 
suggest that managers herd because they want to maintain their reputation in the labour 
market. By mimicking the behaviour of others, managers send a signal that they rely on the 
same stimulus to make decisions and at the same time reassuring of their status. This premise 
is empirically supported in the context of mutual fund managers (Raddatz and Schmukler 2013), 
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equity analysts (Hong, et al., 2000), investment managers (Rajan, 2006), and pension fund 
managers (Da et al., 2018). Rajan (2006) finds that herding might act as an insurance protecting 
management against underperformance whereas Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) suggest analysts 
herd more when negative news needs to be delivered to avoid standing out from the crowd. 
Literature distinguishes between intentional and spurious herding. Intentional herding might 
arise when investors/firms see their position in the market as inferior and therefore imitate 
decisions of more informed and experienced players. ‘Hiding in the herd’ might prevent them 
from being penalised for making a ‘wrong’ decision (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). Secondly, 
individuals might observe positive externality from imitating behaviour of others, for example 
when they believe their peers have information advantage (Chen et al., 2019; Graham, 2003). 
Finally, imitating the behaviour of others might bring an increased pay-off with a rising number 
of agents behaving the same way (see Devenow and Welch, 1996). 
Frijns and Huynh (2018) argue that analysts do not follow each other but their actions simply 
reflect access to the same information, which reduces the asymmetry gap between analysts 
resulting in similar recommendations (Bushee et al., 2010; Tetlock, 2010). On the other hand, 
incentive theory suggests that media coverage might have a negative effect on herding as 
analysts will try to show their individualism by issuing decisions away from the consensus to 
improve their career prospects (Rees et al., 2014).  
Lugo et al. (2015) suggest the first two theories are the most relevant in explaining herding 
behaviour amongst CRAs. Although in theory CRAs are not aware of the rating which will be 
issued by the competitors, once that information is publicly disclosed other CRAs might 
consolidate it into their own ratings (Mariano, 2012). Additionally, as evidenced by Griffin et al. 
(2013), S&P and Moody’s tend to make more strict initial credit assessments when they believe 
the rival’s model to be less stringent. This finding suggests that CRAs account for competitors’ 
views before the security is issued with the initial rating. Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) develop 
a theoretical model suggesting that a CRA that makes a misjudged decision in contrast with the 
leader will be punished by investors. Therefore, CRAs have a strong incentive to herd to protect 
their reputational capital (Lugo et al., 2015). 
Spurious herding takes place when actions of managers correlate with each other due to 
underlying similarities such as educational background, professional experiences, the processes 
in place or the regulatory climate by which they are governed (Chen at al., 2018). With respect 
to CRAs, this theory would suggest that similar rating revisions (or lagged in a short time frame) 
are a result of the homogeneity of the analysts. 
The literature on lead-lag relationships in ratings applies two distinctive methodologies: (i) 
Granger causality models and (ii) Cox proportional hazard models. Güttler and Wahrenburg 
(2007) study biases in ratings and lead-lag relationship for near-to-default corporate issuers 
FIRST-MOVER DISADVANTAGE: THE SOVEREIGN RATINGS MOUSETRAP | 7 
 
holding ratings from Moody’s and S&P between 1997-2004 using Granger causality models.6 
Authors find that once S&P (Moody’s) changes its rating the probability of a rating change by the 
rival CRA significantly increases in magnitude in the short-time horizon (1-180 days).7 Alsakka and 
ap Gwilym (2010) extend this work by studying the herding behaviour on the sovereign level using 
5 CRAs between 1994-2009. They find that S&P (Fitch) is the most (least) independent among 
the CRAs while Moody’s leads in upgrade episodes. Moreover, smaller Japanese CRAs generally 
follow larger CRAs, with the exception of downgrades where they lead Moody’s.  
In contrast with these studies, Chen et al. (2019) assume herding amongst CRAs to be 
heterogenous across sovereigns. Using 35 separate country regressions, authors find that 
herding differs across countries and CRAs. Namely, all CRAs herd towards each other with no 
clear leader and follower that could be attributed to all countries. S&P tends to lead in a 
majority of countries, which might suggest the CRA is more concerned with its reputational 
capital (Camanho et al., 2012). Surprisingly, Fitch leads rating revisions in more countries than 
Moody’s, contrary to the reputational expectations proposed in Lugo et al. (2015).8 Finally, 
Chen et al. (2019) support finding of Lugo et al. (2015) suggesting that herding amongst CRAs 
is intentional.  
In the second stream of literature, Güttler (2011) and Lugo et al. (2015) apply survival analysis 
methodology to assess how rating news by one CRA affects the intensity of rating change by a 
rival CRA. Using S&P- and Moody’s-rated corporate issuers during 1994-2005, Güttler (2011) 
finds that a preceding upgrade (downgrade) by one CRA leads to an increased intensity (one 
notch) of an upgrade (downgrade) by the rival CRA. Lugo et al. (2015) use the  mortgage backed 
securities (MBS) market for the three major CRAs and the Cox proportional hazard models to 
examine how negative news by CRAs (downgrades, outlook and watchlist) affected future 
downgrades of rival CRAs during the financial crisis period (June 2007-July 2011). Their study 
captures the relative differences between the timing of rating actions by CRAs and their 
convergence similar to Güttler (2011). They find that the hazard of an S&P and Moody’s 
downgrade/rating revision is more influenced by a downgrade/revision by one another than by 
that of Fitch. This finding is consistent with the notion that the likelihood to herd increases with 
the reputation of the leader (Mariano, 2012) (S&P and Moody’s have a longer track-record and 
considerably larger market coverage than Fitch and are therefore often considered more 
relevant). 
A limitation of many papers investigating the lead-lag relationship in ratings is that they are 
confined to testing pairs of CRAs in isolation using a restricted number of controls. This view is 
simplistic and does not account for the whole spectrum of the CRA market where relationships 
 
6 A Granger non-causality (GNC) style test examines herding behaviour of CRAs by relative comparison of the 
probability of a rating change by CRA A conditional on a preceding rating change by CRA B. The restriction of 
relative comparison is due to the fact that rating adjustments are not random events. 
7 Somewhat different was a study by Johnson (2004) where using OLS regressions on ratings between 1985-2001, 
the author showed that Egan-Jones leads S&P in downgrades of corporates from BBB- to junk grade ratings. 
8 Fitch is regarded as the CRA with the lowest reputational capital in the context of structured finance products. 
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amongst CRAs are multidimensional.9 Second, the identification of leader-followers is not 
rigorous enough to rule out the possibility of spurious lead-lag relationships due to CRAs 
reacting to different developments in sovereign credit strength. In this paper, we overcome 
these shortcomings by applying a more rigorous strategy to identify the leading CRAs. Finally, 
despite documenting the strong evidence for the lead-lag relationship in sovereign ratings 
among CRAs, prior studies seem to neglect the question of whether there is a significant 
economic cost (benefit) to the leading (following) CRAs. This void in the rating literature will be 
filled by our paper.  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1  Sample selection  
In this paper, we collate a global dataset of daily foreign-currency, sovereign-issuer, long-term 
credit ratings assigned by the three global CRAs, including Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch 
in the period 1 January 2000 - 15 January 2019. Our rating data are obtained from Bloomberg. 
In order to examine the lead-lag relationship among CRAs, we only consider triple rating 
observations, i.e. where all three CRAs assign ratings to the same sovereigns. Ratings are 
converted from alphanumeric symbols to numbers using a 20-notch conversion scale. The 
highest rating category AAA/Aaa receives the highest value of 20, while ratings below CCC-
/Caa3 receive the lowest value of one.  
Similar to the literature (Berwart et al., 2016, Hill and Faff, 2010), our analyses focus on rating 
changes, specifically downgrades and upgrades. In order to identify the leader-follower, we 
require that the rating actions by both the leader and the followers are in the same direction – 
up or down and in a direction different from the previous direction – which will presumably 
reflect CRAs’ reactions to the same developments in sovereign credit strength. In this respect, 
our approach is more rigorous than Hill and Faff (2010).10 Specifically, we require that CRAs’ 
rating actions are associated with a directional reversal of a previously observed credit trend, 
or the changes in ratings after a long period when ratings by all the three CRAs had remained 
stable. We define a reversal of a credit trend as a credit episode in which all the three CRAs 
upgrade (downgrade) the ratings on the sovereign after the last of all three CRAs had previously 
downgraded (upgraded) the ratings. Such an episode reflects the fact that eventually all the 
three CRAs agree the trend in the credit quality of the sovereign has reversed, i.e. it has 
improved after a period of deterioration (or it has deteriorated after a period of improvement), 
and all the three CRAs react in the same manner by upgrading (downgrading) the ratings.11 
 
9 Although Lugo et al. (2015) estimate relative influence of three major CRAs in some model specifications their 
identification strategy assumes that the ratings levels reached a consensus view (it is common knowledge that 
CRAs take into account the existing rating of their rival CRA when making their own credit assessment). 
10 In Hill and Faff (2010), the leader is the CRA that takes the new information rating actions, i.e. rating changes 
are in the opposite direction to the preceding change or take the rating level to a new higher (lower) level.  
11 For example, there may have been a period where all three CRAs had raised their rating on a sovereign at least 
once. A change in trend episode would be observed if, after the last of the three agencies had thus raised its rating 
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Alongside the credit trend reversal, we also identify credit episodes where all the three CRAs 
upgrade (downgrade) ratings on the sovereigns after a prolonged period of no changes in 
ratings. We require that the no-change period be at least five years.12 All rating actions must 
have occurred after 1 January 2000 and before 15 January 2019 for all sovereigns in the dataset. 
Each rating reversal episode must last less than five years from the first to the third rating action 
to be counted (we relax this assumption later, see Table 2). We impose the five-year horizon 
on our data because it is increasingly likely that rating actions by different CRAs which lie more 
than five years apart reflect the CRAs’ reactions to new and different developments impacting 
sovereign’s credit strength. In other words, we assume that if not all three CRAs have reacted 
in the same direction within five years there was no consensus across the three CRAs that the 
factor that may have led the first agency to change the rating truly constituted a material 
difference to a sovereign’s credit strength. Finally, we rely on rating changes only and do not 
analyse outlooks on ratings as these signals merely indicate where ratings might be moving in 
the next year or two (S&P, 2014). 
Unlike the common approach of examining lead-lag relationship by pairs of CRAs in the 
literature (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010; Berwart et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2019; Güttler and 
Wahrenburg, 2007), we examine the lead-lag relationship between three CRAs simultaneously. 
Accordingly, we do not examine episodes in which only two CRAs change the ratings. Therefore, 
we require that each episode in our sample must incorporate rating changes by all three CRAs. 
Accordingly, the ‘leader’ is defined as the CRA taking the first rating action in a rating reversal 
episode and the ‘follower’ is the CRA taking the second and the third rating action in an episode. 
Our approach has a number of advantages over related studies. First, it enables us to identify 
the leading CRA by looking at the relative timeliness of their rating actions in comparison with 
their competitors. Second, we minimise the likelihood of spurious analyses due to grouping 
rating actions associated with different trends in the sovereign’s credit quality.  
We identify 120 episodes of credit trend reversal, including 55 downgrade episodes and 65 
upgrade episodes in 73 countries worldwide. Although a majority of the countries encounter 
only one episode during the sample period, there are 32 countries experiencing multiple 
episodes of both types (downgrades and upgrade), accounting for 43.8% of 73 countries in the 
sample. Brazil and Greece are the two countries where episodes of credit trend reversal occur 
most frequently (4 times in Brazil and 5 times in Greece).  
Figure 1 depicts the frequency of being the first mover for the three leading CRAs. S&P leads 
63 out of 120 episodes (52.5% of the time), making them the most frequent first mover in all 
the episodes of both types. Moody’s and Fitch tend to follow S&P when new developments 
signal a reversal in the trends of the sovereigns’ credit strength. When looking into the types of 
 
on the sovereign, all three agencies subsequently lowered their respective rating on the same sovereign (we 
disregard whether rating actions are taken in steps of single or multiple notches. It is only the direction that 
matters). This is our practical definition of a turning credit cycle for a specific sovereign, whatever the underlying 
reason may be. This study looks at this type of trend reversal: the rating trajectory moves into a new direction for 
all three CRAs. 
12 For instance, the downgrade of France since 2012 from the decades-long ‘AAA’ rating by all three CRAs. 
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the episodes, we find that S&P takes rating actions more promptly than Moody’s and Fitch 
when credit trends change in both positive and negative directions. S&P leads Moody’s and 
Fitch 63% of the time in the case of downgrades and 43% of the time in the case of upgrades 
(See Figures 2 and 3). Our preliminary results corroborate the findings in Alsakka and ap Gwilym 
(2010) that S&P is the CRA most independent from actions by other CRAs, especially in the case 
of downgrades. 
Figure 1. Who moves first? All rating events 
 
 









First CRA to move when trend changes in the opposite direction








First CRA to move when trend changes in the positive direction
Who moves first when creditworthiness improves?
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In order to answer the question of how long it takes for a CRA to catch up with the leader when 
they are a follower in an episode, we look at their time-lag by calculating the number of days 
from the day the leader raises (lowers) the rating to the day the follower takes the same action. 
The time lag varies from one day to 1,825 days.13 Figure 4 summarises the median time-lag for 
each CRA. Fitch tends to move faster than Moody’s in catching up with the leader. Specifically, 
it takes Fitch 213 days to catch up with the first mover while it is 364 days for Moody’s. Moody’s 
typically follows more slowly than Fitch and S&P in both upgrade episodes and downgrade 
episodes. It takes 442 (311) days for Moody’s to catch up with the first mover on upgrading 
(downgrading).  
Figure 3. Who moves first when creditworthiness deteriorates? 
 
Note: Figure shows median number of days it takes CRA to catch up with the first mover. 
Figure 4. Typically it takes less than a year to follow the leader (median days) 
 
Source: Calculations based on data in Appendix Table 1. 
 
13 The only exception is when Moody’s took 1,861 days to downgrade Greece (22/12/09) following downgrades 
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3.2 The multivariate analysis of lead-lag relationship 
In order to examine the interdependence among the three CRAs, we employ a Cox proportional 
hazard model. The Cox proportional hazard model has been used to analyse the timing of rating 
downgrades on other asset classes such as ABS Home Equity Loan (Lugo et al., 2015) and 
corporate bonds (Mählmann, 2011). Our Cox hazard rate model examines the downgrade 
(upgrade) rate for a sovereign i, which is denoted ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) and specified by the following semi-
parametric regression model: 
     ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡𝑡)𝑒𝑒(𝜷𝜷𝜷𝜷)      (1) 
Where ℎ0(𝑡𝑡) is the baseline hazard, which will be left unestimated, and the regression 
coefficients 𝜷𝜷 will be estimated from our dataset.  
Under our Cox proportional hazard model, we define failure by either downgrade or upgrade 
and measure the time to the first failure, i.e. downgrade (upgrade), by the number of elapsed 
days since the onset of the downgrade (upgrade) risk, which we set to be the first day of our 
sample period (1 January 2000) or the first day the rating is assigned if the initial rating 
assignment occurs after 1 January 2000. The sovereign exits the sample at the first occurrence 
of the first downgrade (upgrade) by the analysed CRA. For each CRA from which the downgrade 
(upgrade) hazard is being analysed on the LHS of the model, the RHS variable (covariate 𝜷𝜷) is a 
binary one that takes value of unity if another CRA has already downgraded (upgraded) the 
sovereigns, zero otherwise. We utilise the same dataset of 73 countries experiencing 55 
episodes of negative credit trend reversal (downgrade episodes) and 65 episodes of positive 
credit trend reversal (upgrade episodes).  
Following Lugo et al. (2015), for each CRA, we estimate three models: two models examine the 
effect of the downgrade (upgrade) by each rival CRA and one model examines the joint effect 
of the downgrades (upgrades) by both rival CRAs. The general prediction for interdependence 
implies that the downgrade (upgrade) hazard by a given CRA increases with the presence of an 
earlier similar rating action from the rival CRA. We predict that S&P is the least dependent CRA, 
particularly in the episodes of negative credit trend reversal. Therefore, we expect to observe 
a strong evidence that the intensity of downgrades (upgrades) by Moody’s and Fitch (followers) 
is influenced by similar actions by S&P (the leader). We also expect to find less (or no) evidence 
that the intensity of downgrades (upgrades) by S&P is influenced by Moody’s and Fitch. To 
control for the sovereigns’ characteristics that might affect their hazard rates, we include as 
controls the initial sovereign credit ratings (or ratings that prevailed on 1 January 2000 if the 
sovereigns had been rated prior to this date) and their economic fundamentals including GDP 
per capita and government budget balance (as percentage of GDP) reported in the years 
immediately preceding the rating actions. We source the macroeconomic data directly from 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Development Indicators.  
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3.3 The multivariate analysis of commercial trap hypothesis 
Although empirical investigations into the lead-lag relationship among global CRAs often cite 
S&P as being the most independent in downgrading sovereigns (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010, 
Hill and Faff, 2010, Chen et al., 2019), none of these studies look into the commercial impact 
of such downgrades on the CRAs making the downgrades, particularly the leader-CRA, in this 
case S&P. Therefore, we fill this void in the literature, providing original insights into this issue. 
In order to answer the question of whether sovereign rating downgrades incur significant 
negative financial repercussions for the downgrading CRA, we examine the direct impact of 
S&P’s sovereign rating downgrades on the probability that rating contracts are cancelled by 
sovereign clients. Loss of rating contracts with sovereign clients does not only affect S&P’s 
financial result in the sovereign rating segment but also causes a loss in rating revenues in non-
sovereign asset classes. This is because there may be non-sovereign issuers in a jurisdiction 
where the sovereign cancels the contract that would discontinue their own rating contract, 
because their ratings are tied to the sovereign or because they are owned and controlled by 
the sovereign (such as state-owned enterprises, or some financial institutions). A prominent 
example of that is the exclusion of S&P from rating the large inaugural $12 billion bond in April 
2019 issued by Saudi Aramco, the state-owned oil company of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
which had previously cancelled the rating contract with S&P following a first-mover downgrade 
by that CRA. We are not able to measure this unobservable commercial loss to a first-mover 
CRA, but acknowledge that it could be significant. 
We trawled through S&P’s press releases to identify the dates when sovereign clients cancelled 
contracts with this CRA. There are two possible signals of contracts being cancelled. First, S&P 
withdraws and discontinues the ratings due to cancellation of contracts upon request of the 
sovereign issuer. Second, although contracts are cancelled, S&P continues to keep the ratings 
on an unsolicited basis due to market interest in the sovereign clients’ creditworthiness. We 
rely on three reports by S&P released on 24 February 2011 in which S&P announced unsolicited 
ratings for fourteen countries worldwide, including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Australia, Cambodia, India, Japan, Singapore, 
Taiwan and the United States (S&P, 2011a, S&P, 2011b, S&P, 2011c). There have been four 
more similar announcements since 2011, including Turkey in 2013, Sweden and Portugal in 
2014, and Saudi Arabia in 2015. Ratings for Gabon, Tunisia, Guernsey and the Isle of Man were 
withdrawn by S&P rather than surveyed on an unsolicited basis. Guernsey was later reinstated 
upon signing a new rating agreement with S&P. The data availability of solicitation status for 
the other two biggest CRAs (Moody’s and Fitch) is not widely available and the European CRA 
Regulator (ESMA) reports only the most recent solicitation status. Therefore, it is more difficult 
to identify similar losses of sovereign contracts for these CRAs. 
Our multivariate analysis utilising the information on solicitation status and rating withdrawals 
is based on a linear probability regression model specified as follows: 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕 + 𝑹𝑹𝒋𝒋 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   (2) 
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Where the dependent variable 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a binary variable taking value one in year t if 
S&P already withdrew a sovereign rating or switched it from solicited to unsolicited status. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3 is a dummy variable taking value of unity if S&P downgrades sovereign i in 
year t-3, zero otherwise; and 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3 is a dummy for S&P being the first mover in an 
episode of negative credit trend reversal in sovereign i. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is an i.i.d random disturbance term. 
To control for the time-variant global market factors, we add a full set of year dummies 𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕 as 
controls. We also control for the region-specific factors by adding a full set of region dummies 
𝑹𝑹𝒋𝒋. If downgrading a sovereign and being the first CRA to downgrade a sovereign increase the 
likelihood of losing customers, we expect the coefficients on 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3 and 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3 
to be positive and significant.  
New sovereign clients are typically advised by sell-side ratings advisors. Since advisors want the 
best ratings for their clients, they may advise governments to stay away from the most 
conservative CRA, i.e. S&P. Given the commercial trap hypothesis holds, one would expect that 
over time the coverage of S&P in terms of sovereigns covered globally and across regions would 
gradually decline. For example, if the ratio of rated sovereigns by S&P would have been 1.2x 
those of Moody’s in 2000, that ratio might fall to 1.1 for example, as new customers eschew 
S&P upon advice of their financial advisors from investment banks. Therefore, the penalty for 
the first mover can be measured by the changes in their relative sovereign rating coverage 
following the downgrades.  
We test the above prediction empirically with a multivariate linear regression model, which is 
specified as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕 + 𝑹𝑹𝒋𝒋 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡    (3) 
Where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 measures S&P’s relative sovereign rating coverage for region j in year t, and the 
RHS variables remain the same as in Eq. (2) 
Firstly, we define 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 as the ratio of S&P sovereign rating coverage to Moody’s (Fitch’s) 
sovereign rating coverage calculated for each of the three geographical regions, i.e. EMEA, 
Americas and Asia Pacific, in a given year. Such a ratio indicates the S&P’s market power relative 
to its major rivals. Secondly, we define 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  by the proportion of sovereigns rated by S&P in 
a year to the total number of sovereigns rated by any of the three global CRAs in the same 
year.14 Our second definition of 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 follows Becker and Milbourn (2011) in calculating S&P’s 
sovereign rating market share. Here, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is referred to as S&P’s annual region market share.  
With both definitions, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 varies by region and year. In order to control for the time-variant 
market factors that affect S&P’s relative sovereign rating coverage, we add a full set of year 
dummies 𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕 as controls. We also control for the region-specific time-invariant factors by adding 
a full set of region dummies. If sovereign rating downgrades reduce S&P’s sovereign rating 
coverage relative to their rival CRAs as well as their sovereign rating market share, particularly 
 
14 References to the three global CRAs denote S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. 
FIRST-MOVER DISADVANTAGE: THE SOVEREIGN RATINGS MOUSETRAP | 15 
 
when they downgrade the sovereign before Moody’s and Fitch do so as well, we expect to 
observe negative and significant coefficients on 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3 and 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3. 
Eq. (3) investigates S&P’s downgrade on a single country level. It can be argued that it is S&P’s 
sovereign rating downgrade intensity that causes the decline in S&P’s relative sovereign rating 
coverage and market share. This is because sovereign clients observe the frequency of 
downgrades in a particular region to identify the most downgrade-prone CRA. Then we should 
expect that sovereign rating downgrade intensity affects S&P’s future sovereign rating 
coverage and sovereign rating market share in the similar manner as a downgrade on a single 
country. To test this prediction, we estimate a linear regression model specified as follows:  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 + 𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕 + 𝑹𝑹𝒋𝒋 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡   (4) 
The subscript j stands for one of the three regions in our sample, including EMEA, Americas and 
Asia Pacific. Subscript t represents the month. Each region-month observation constitutes one 
data point in this model. DownIntensity is the number of S&P’s downgrades and FMIntensity is 
the number of S&P’s first-mover downgrades. We count the downgrades for each region in 
each month, disregarding the magnitudes of the downgrades. First-mover downgrades are the 
sovereign downgrades where S&P is the first mover in an episode of negative credit trend 
reversal identified in Section 3.1. Similar to Eq. (3), 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is S&P’s annual region sovereign 
rating market share and sovereign rating coverage ratios (relative to Moody’s or Fitch). The 
time-lag between the region-month observation of downgrade (and first-mover downgrade) 
intensity and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is three years (k=36 months). If our prediction is supported by the data, we 
expect to find negative and significant coefficients on DownIntensity and FMIntensity. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Lead-lag relationship in sovereign rating changes 
In Table 1, we report all 120 episodes of credit trend reversal of both types in our sample period. 
We supplement the data with a leadership index and report the z-statistics for a Wilcoxon 
matched-pair sign rank test on the equivalence in the rank between S&P and their rival CRAs, 
namely Moody’s and Fitch at the bottom rows of each panel. We devise the comprehensive 
index to quantify the relative timeliness of a CRA in spotting the changes in the credit trend of 
a sovereign. In particular, the index is specified as follows: 
LeadIndexi = �pr × ri3
r=1
 
Where 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 is the leadership index of CRA i, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 is the rank of CRA i in an episode, and pr 
is the percentage of the times CRA i gets the rank r.  
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In theory, the 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 takes any value in the continuous range between one and three. In 
the first most extreme case, CRA i leads 100% of the time, their Leadership Index is one. In the 
second most extreme case, CRA i is the last mover in all episodes, hence their Leadership Index 
takes value of three. If all the three CRAs are equally likely to be the first mover, i.e. there is no 
systematic difference in the timeliness of rating actions across the three CRAs, the leadership 
index for each CRA would be 2.  
Hill and Faff (2010) employ the leader-follower ratio (LFR) initiated by Cooper et al. (2001) to 
examine the lead-lag relationship between S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. Their LFR is the ratio of the 
time from the preceding rating action by another CRA to the time to the succeeding rating action 
by another CRA. Our index differs from theirs in that our index points directly to the weighted 
average rank of a CRA where the weight is the frequency of the rank and the rank is specified 
under our rigorous identification procedure mentioned earlier.  
Consistent with the figures, Table 1 shows a clear trend for S&P to lead the sovereign rating 
market. Their Leadership Index calculated on 120 episodes of credit trend reversal is 1.68, which 
is lower than both Moody’s (2.20) and Fitch (2.11). The leadership index of S&P is 1.51 and 1.85 
for downgrade episodes and upgrade episodes, respectively. Both values point to S&P as the first 
mover for both directions in the changes of sovereign credit trends. The Wilcoxon sign-rank tests 
show that S&P’s leadership is more pronounced in downgrade episodes than in upgrade 
episodes. The evidence for S&P’s leadership is stronger in Europe & Central Asia, Middle East and 
Africa (EMEA) and Americas. S&P’s relative position is less distinct in Asia Pacific for positive 
changes in sovereign credit quality (upgrade episodes). The variation of S&P’s leadership across 
three geographical regions does not change materially when we consider upgrade episodes 
separately from downgrade episodes. In Asia Pacific where the S&P’s leadership in upgrading 
sovereign ratings becomes less obvious, we find a more prominent role played by Moody’s in 
leading the upgrade episodes (Table 1, Panel I). Nevertheless, the z-statistic fails to reject the null 
that Moody’s rank is indistinguishable from S&P’s.   
To examine the time variation in the timeliness of rating actions across the three leading CRAs, 
we split the episodes into four subperiods: 2000-2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2014, and 2015-2019 
and recalculate the leadership index for each CRA across 120 episodes, 55 downgrade episodes 
and 65 upgrade episodes (Table 1, Panel II). Episodes are classified into one of the four sub-
periods based on the dates of the rating changes by the first mover. In contrast to Güttler and 
Wahrenburg (2007) who highlight the propensity for Moody’s to lead S&P in detecting corporate 
failure, our data show that S&P’s leadership in spotting negative sovereign credit quality persists 
over time. S&P’s leadership role intensifies over the years, especially in the period 2005-2009 and 
most recent period 2015-2018. During the subperiod 2010-2014, there is a switch in the 
leadership of downgrade trends from S&P to Moody’s. S&P’s downgrades are slightly less timely 
than Moody’s downgrades. Nevertheless, the difference in timeliness of rating downgrades 
between Moody’s and S&P during this period is not statistically significant. When there is an 
improvement in sovereign credit strength, S&P moves first in half the full sample period. In the 
subperiods 2000-2004 and 2010-2014, Fitch tends to upgrade slightly faster than S&P and 
Moody’s, hence becomes the first mover on average during those periods. However, the 
differences in the rank between Fitch and S&P are not significantly different from zero. 
FIRST-MOVER DISADVANTAGE: THE SOVEREIGN RATINGS MOUSETRAP | 17 
 
Table 1. Who moves first?  
      
PANEL I Changes in trend (both directions) Changes in trend (upgrades only) Changes in trend (downgrades only) 
  S&P Moody's Fitch S&P Moody's Fitch S&P Moody's Fitch 
ALL OBSERVATIONS          
First mover (%) 53 25 23 43 28 29 64 22 15 
Second mover (%) 27 30 44 29 25 46 24 36 42 
Third mover (%) 21 45 33 28 48 25 13 42 44 
Observations 120 120 120 65 65 65 55 55 55 
Leadership index 1.68 2.20 2.11 1.85 2.22 1.96 1.51 2.2 2.31 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test  -3.80*** -3.30***  -1.90* -0.61  -3.61*** -3.98*** 
EMEA (ALL PERIODS)         
First mover (%) 58 23 19 45 25 30 71 21 8 
Second mover (%) 23 35 44 28 33 40 18 37 47 
Third mover (%) 19 42 37 28 43 30 11 42 45 
Observations 78 78 78 40 40 40 38 38 38 
Leadership index 1.62 2.19 2.18 1.85 2.2 2.0 1.4 2.21 2.37 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test  -3.30*** -3.50**  -1.43 -0.81  -3.21*** -4.13*** 
AMERICAS (ALL PERIODS)         
First mover (%) 48 21 31 50 19 31 46 23 31 
Second mover (%) 31 24 45 25 19 56 38 31 31 
Third mover (%) 21 55 24 25 63 13 15 46 38 
Observations 29 29 29 16 16 16 13 13 13 
Leadership index 1.72 2.34 1.93 1.75 2.44 1.81 1.69 2.23 2.08 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test  -2.44** -0.69  -1.92* -0.11  -1.50 -0.91 
ASIAN PACIFIC (ALL PERIODS)          
First mover (%) 31 46 23 22 56 22 50 25 25 
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Second mover (%) 38 15 46 44 0 56 25 50 25 
Third mover (%) 31 38 31 33 44 22 25 25 50 
Observations 13 13 13 9 9 9 4 4 4 
Leadership index 2.00 1.92 2.08 2.11 1.89 2.00 1.75 2.00 2.25 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test  0.14 -0.23  0.43 0.33  -0.38 -0.56 
Continued 
PANEL II S&P Moody's Fitch S&P Moody's Fitch S&P Moody's Fitch 
2000-2004 (ALL REGIONS)          
First mover (%) 43 24 33 35 29 35 75 0 25 
Second mover (%) 26 29 45 32 26 41 0 38 63 
Third mover (%) 31 48 21 32 44 24 25 63 13 
Observations 42 42 42 34 34 34 8 8 8 
Leadership index 1.88 2.24 1.88 1.97 2.15 1.88 1.50 2.63 1.88 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test  -1.45 0.00  -0.56 0.32  -2.02** -0.58 
2005-2009 (ALL REGIONS)          
First mover (%) 63 25 13 60 30 10 64 21 14 
Second mover (%) 29 8 63 20 20 60 36 0 64 
Third mover (%) 8 67 25 20 50 30 0 79 21 
Observations 24 24 24 10 10 10 14 14 14 
Leadership index 1.46 2.42 2.13 1.60 2.20 2.20 1.36 2.57 2.07 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test  -3.05*** -2.90***  -1.31 -1.46  -2.83*** -2.67*** 
2010-2014 (ALL REGIONS)          
First mover (%) 42 33 24 33 25 42 48 38 14 
Second mover (%) 33 42 24 42 25 33 29 52 19 
Third mover (%) 24 24 52 25 50 25 24 10 67 
Observations 33 33 33 12 12 12 21 21 21 
Leadership index 1.82 1.91 2.27 1.92 2.25 1.83 1.76 1.71 2.52 
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Wilcoxon signed-rank test  -0.37 -1.75*  -0.86 0.25  0.22 -0.20** 
2015-2018 (ALL REGIONS)          
First mover (%) 76 14 10 67 22 11 83 8 8 
Second mover (%) 14 38 52 11 22 67 17 50 42 
Third mover (%) 10 48 38 22 56 22 0 42 50 
Observations 21 21 21 9 9 9 12 12 12 
Leadership index 1.33 2.33 2.29 1.55 2.34 2.11 1.17 2.34 2.42 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test  -2.90*** -2.99***  -1.47 -1.25  -2.81*** -2.83*** 
Continued 
PANEL III S&P Moody's Fitch S&P Moody's Fitch S&P Moody's Fitch 
SMALL BORROWERS (LESS THAN $100 BIL. OF SOVEREIGN DEBT IN 2018)     
First mover (%) 57 18 25 54 15 32 61 21 18 
Second mover (%) 25 33 43 24 29 46 26 37 39 
Third mover (%) 18 49 32 22 56 22 13 42 42 
Observations 79 79 79 41 41 41 38 38 38 
Leadership index 1.61 2.32 2.06 1.68 2.41 1.9 1.52 2.21 2.22 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test -4.10*** -2.87***  -2.85*** -1.10  -2.94*** -2.97***  
LARGE BORROWERS (MORE THAN $100 BIL. OF SOVEREIGN DEBT IN 2018)                        
First mover (%) 44 39 17 25 50 25 71 24 6 
Second mover (%) 29 24 46 38 17 46 18 35 47 
Third mover (%) 27 37 37 38 33 29 12 41 47 
Observations 41 41 41 24 24 24 17 17 17 
Leadership index 1.83 1.98 2.20 2.13 1.83 2.04 1.41 2.18 2.41 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test -0.88 -1.65*  0.65 0.42  -2.10** -2.75***  
Notes: This Table presents distribution of trend changes across CRAs, regions, times and issuers’ size of the debt issuance. Regions include Europe, Middle East, Central Asia (EMEA), Americas, and Asia 
Pacific. Small (large) borrower relates to a sovereign with less than (more than) $100 billion of sovereign debt outstanding in 2018. The leadership index represents the sample mean rank of each CRA. 
A value of 1 indicates that a CRA is the first mover in all episodes covered, a value of 3 would result for a CRA that moves last in all episodes. The Wilcoxon sign-rank test reports the z-statistic on the 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test for the null hypothesis that the rank difference between S&P and Moody’s (Fitch) is zero. Significance levels are: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%. 
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Table 2. Leadership Index under different timespans between first and last mover  
Panel I S&P  












Total number of episodes (all periods, regions, both rating directions) 52 88 106 116 120 
Total Leadership index (all periods, regions, both rating directions) 1.73 1.67 1.66 1.70 1.68 
Leadership: Upgrades only (all periods, regions) 1.91 1.91 1.83 1.85 1.85 
Leadership: Downgrades only (all periods, regions) 1.57 1.46 1.48 1.53 1.51 
EMEA (all periods, all rating directions) 1.59 1.56 1.59 1.64 1.62 
Americas (all periods, all rating directions) 2.00 1.82 1.76 1.71 1.72 
Asia & Pacific (all periods, all rating directions) 1.67 2.00 1.91 2.00 2.00 
2000-2004 (all regions, both rating directions) 1.88 1.93 1.92 1.90 1.88 
2005-2009 (all regions, both rating directions) 1.67 1.42 1.40 1.45 1.46 
2010-2014 (all regions, both rating directions) 2.07 1.86 1.76 1.84 1.82 
2015-2018 (all regions, both rating directions) 1.23 1.35 1.33 1.33 1.33 
Panel II Moody's  












Total number of episodes (all periods, regions, both rating directions) 52 88 106 116 120 
Total Leadership index (all periods, regions, both rating directions) 2.10 2.24 2.22 2.17 2.20 
Leadership: Upgrades only (all periods, regions) 2.09 2.2 2.22 2.22 2.22 
Leadership: Downgrades only (all periods, regions) 2.11 2.27 2.23 2.13 2.2 
EMEA (all periods, all rating directions) 2.00 2.23 2.20 2.16 2.19 
Americas (all periods, all rating directions) 2.18 2.32 2.32 2.32 2.34 
Asia & Pacific (all periods, all rating directions) 2.67 2.11 2.09 1.92 1.92 
2000-2004 (all regions, both rating directions) 2.19 2.26 2.22 2.22 2.24 
2005-2009 (all regions, both rating directions) 2.22 2.47 2.50 2.36 2.42 
2010-2014 (all regions, both rating directions) 1.64 1.91 1.93 1.88 1.91 
2015-2018 (all regions, both rating directions) 2.38 2.35 2.33 2.33 2.33 
Panel III Fitch  












Total number of episodes (all periods, regions, both rating directions) 52 88 106 116 120 
Total Leadership index (all periods, regions, both rating directions) 2.15 2.08 2.11 2.12 2.11 
Leadership: Upgrades only (all periods, regions) 2 1.91 1.95 1.96 1.96 
Leadership: Downgrades only (all periods, regions) 2.29 2.25 2.33 2.33 2.31 
EMEA (all periods, all rating directions) 2.38 2.19 2.20 2.19 2.18 
Americas (all periods, all rating directions) 1.82 1.86 1.92 1.96 1.93 
Asia & Pacific (all periods, all rating directions) 1.67 1.89 2.00 2.08 2.08 
2000-2004 (all regions, both rating directions) 1.94 1.81 1.86 1.88 1.88 
2005-2009 (all regions, both rating directions) 2.11 2.11 2.10 2.18 2.13 
2010-2014 (all regions, both rating directions) 2.29 2.23 2.31 2.28 2.27 
2015-2018 (all regions, both rating directions) 2.31 2.25 2.29 2.29 2.29 
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Notes: In this Table we re-define the episodes for three CRAs within windows ranging from one year to five years. We report 
Leadership Index for upgrades, downgrades, regions as well as sub-periods. 
 
The timeliness in detecting reversals of sovereign credit trend is valuable to investors, 
particularly when the sovereigns concerned are frequent borrowers on the capital market, i.e. 
they have a large amount of sovereign marketable debt outstanding. In Panel III of Table 1, we 
segregate episodes concerning large sovereign borrowers from those concerning small 
borrowers. We define the large borrowers as those having at least $100 billion of sovereign 
debt outstanding in 2018. We source the data on sovereign debt from S&P’s February 2019 
report “Sovereign debt 2019: Global borrowing to increase by 3.2% to US $7.8 trillion” (S&P, 
2019b). Out of 120 episodes of credit trend reversal, there are 41 episodes concerning large 
sovereign borrowers. S&P moves first 44% of the time, followed by Moody’s (39%) and Fitch 
(17%). S&P’s leadership is mostly driven by their tendency to downgrade faster than Moody’s 
and Fitch when sovereign creditworthiness deteriorates. As far as the small sovereign 
borrowers are concerned, S&P’s leadership role is even more pronounced. Specifically, they 
move first 57% of the time, followed by Fitch (25%) and Moody’s (18%).  
In Table 1, we report the results based on 120 episodes of credit trend reversals which are 
defined within five years. There is no theoretical rationale for our chosen time span. Therefore, 
to examine the robustness of the results, we re-define the episodes within various windows 
ranging from one year to five years. Our results are displayed in Table 2. For brevity, we only 
report the leadership index which indicates the average rank of each CRA across five different 
time windows between one and five years. Across all the five windows, S&P demonstrates the 
least dependence among the three leading CRAs, especially with regards to trends of 
deterioration in sovereign credit quality (downgrades). Our earlier findings concerning S&P’s 
leadership in EMEA and Americas continue to hold at time windows shorter than five years. 
There is also little heterogeneity in the time evolution of the relative timeliness of rating actions 
by three CRAs across five different time windows. In summary, the evidence in favour of S&P 
as the first mover for both upgrading and downgrading trends remains robust.  
Thus far our analyses cover episodes of reversal of credit trends, hence the rating levels 
associated with the rating actions in the episodes are not taken into consideration, i.e. it is only 
the direction of the rating action that matters. Nevertheless, it is believed that rating actions 
that cross the investment grade-speculative boundary (between BBB-/Baa3 and BB/Ba1). They 
have significant implications for investors’ trading decisions. A downgrade that brings a 
sovereign from investment grade to speculative status (a ‘fallen angel’) can trigger a forced sell 
off from the part of institutional investors or instigate certain contractual obligations under the 
debt covenants. On the other hand, an upgrade that lifts a sovereign from speculative status to 
investment grade (a ‘rising star’) increases the sovereign’s investor base since many large 
institutional investors are only allowed to hold debt instruments with investment grade ratings. 
Given the importance of rating actions that cross the investment grade-speculative boundary, 
we investigate the relative timeliness of three leading CRAs in respect of taking such actions 
(Table 3). We identify rating actions that cross the divide as either rising stars or fallen angels 
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and examine the lead-lag relationship between the three CRAs for such cases. There are 15 
episodes associated with rising stars and 10 episodes associated with fallen angels in our 
sample (See Appendix Table 2).  
Figure 5. Leadership Index (1= first mover in all episodes, 3= third mover in all episodes, 
number of episodes in parentheses) 
 
The leader in upgrading sovereigns to investment grade is Fitch. The countries affected come 
from a mix of three geographical regions, EMEA, Americas and Asia Pacific. Fitch tends to move 
first in 40% of the upgrade episodes, followed by S&P (33%) and Moody’s (27%). By contrast, 
S&P leads the episodes of fallen angels. They are the first mover 80% of the time, followed by 
Moody’s (20%). Fitch never leads in any episodes of fallen angels. A majority of the fallen angels 
are EMEA countries, including Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, 
and Tunisia (for details on the individual episodes see Appendix Table 2). Figure 5 illustrates the 
patterns when ratings move across the investment grade divide, using the Leadership Index as 
defined in Section 1 and shown in Table 1. The distribution of first-mover status in rising star 
episodes is relatively even. As far as fallen angels are concerned, S&P is the clear leader, with 
Fitch lagging and Moody’s sitting right in between in a neutral position.  
Table 3. Rising Stars and Fallen Angels 
PANEL I: RISING STARS  
 S&P rank Moody’s rank Fitch rank 
First  33% 27% 40% 
Second 47% 20% 33% 
Third 20% 53% 27% 
Episodes 15 15 15 
Leadership Index 1.87 2.27 1.87 














Rising Stars (15) Fallen Angels (10)
S&P Moody's Fitch
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PANEL II: FALLEN ANGELS 
  
First  80% 20% 0% 
Second 10% 50% 40% 
Third 10% 30% 60% 
Episodes 10 10 10 
Leadership Index 1.3 2.1 2.6 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test  -1.63 -2.57*** 
Notes: This Table presents rank of each CRA as first mover, second mover and the last mover in the episodes where an 
investment-speculative grade boundary (BBB-/Baa3 – BB+/Ba1) has been crossed. Panel I lists episodes when sovereigns have 
been uplifted from a speculative grade status to an investment grade (Rising stars), whereas Panel II lists episodes when 
sovereigns were downgraded from an investment grade to a speculative grade (Fallen angels). Refer to Appendix Table 2 for a 
full list of episodes. The Wilcoxon sign-rank test reports the z-statistic on the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test for the 
null hypothesis that the rank difference between S&P and Moody’s (Fitch) is zero. Significance levels are: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, 
* p<10%. 
 
To sum up, our preliminary results show that S&P is the most independent CRA and typically 
fastest to respond to a deterioration in sovereign credit strength. Such prompt actions from 
the CRAs are welcomed by rating users whose investment decisions are informed by CRAs’ 
credit opinions. In general, we find that S&P’s leadership persists over time and holds 
particularly strong for downgrades across the investment grade divide. They also lead in 
upgrade trends, though there are cases in which Fitch tends to act slightly faster, such as 
crossing the investment grade divide from below.  
4.2 The Cox proportional hazard model 
In Table 4, we report the estimation results of the Cox proportional hazard model. We 
summarise the results of downgrades in Panel I and upgrades in Panel II. Specifications (1), (2), 
and (3) in each Panel report the coefficient estimates for S&P. Specifications (4), (5) and (6) 
report the estimates for Moody’s. Finally, specification (7), (8) and (9) report the estimates for 
Fitch. Results show that rating actions by the three CRAs tend to herd toward each other. For 
example, in Panel I the hazard of downgrades from Moody’s and Fitch increases steadily for 
sovereigns previously downgraded by S&P. For example, downgrade intensity by Moody’s 
conditional on S&P’s downgrade is 3.2, whereas downgrade intensity by Fitch conditional on 
S&P is 3.9. This means that downgrade by Moody’s (Fitch) is 225% (287%) more likely if there 
was a downgrade by S&P. We find a similar increase in the downgrade hazard from S&P for 
sovereigns previously downgraded by Moody’s and Fitch, but to a lesser extent by the latter 
CRA (downgrade intensity by S&P conditional on Fitch is 3.0). The overall lower t-statistics for 
S&P underline the slightly less pronounced herding behaviour of S&P towards the competition 
than the other way around.  In the joint effects model, we find that, other things equal, Moody’s 
and Fitch are influenced more by S&P than they influence each other (specifications (6) and 
(9)). Considering the case of S&P in specification (3), S&P’s downgrades are more strongly 
influenced by prior similar actions from Moody’s than from Fitch. For example, downgrade 
intensity by S&P conditional on Moody’s is 2.7 whereas that of Fitch 1.6, i.e. a downgrade by 
S&P is 173% (61%) more likely if there was a prior downgrade by Moody’s (Fitch) respectively. 
In terms of leadership, downgrades by S&P undoubtably influence downgrades by Moody’s and 
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Fitch to a greater extent than Moody’s and Fitch influence each other. For instance, downgrade 
intensity by Moody’s (Fitch) conditional on S&P is 2.6 (3.4). On the other hand, Moody’s intensity 
conditional on Fitch and vice versa is 1.6 and 1.7 respectively.  
We find very similar results for upgrades in Panel II of Table 4. S&P is the least dependent CRA 
and tends to influence its rivals’ rating actions more than the other way around. In specifications 
(3) and (6), Fitch tends to lead both S&P and Moody’s in the upgrading trends. Nevertheless, 
when being a follower in an upgrade trend, the intensity of upgrades by Fitch is influenced by 
S&P more than by Moody’s (specification 9). 




PANEL I: DOWNGRADES   




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
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- - - - 3.642*
** 
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*   
(-2.02) (-1.96) (-1.98) (-2.72) (-1.89) (-2.08) (-2.66) (-1.76) (-1.69) 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 280587 280587 280587 290074 290074 290074 289372 289372 289372 







S&P Moody's Fitch 
Upgraded by (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
S&P 
 



















- - - - 2.272*
** 
0.996*
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(-1.50) (0.11) (-0.11) (-0.41) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.79) (-2.07) (-1.32) 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 182633 182633 182633 186358 186358 186358 180794 180794 180794 
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Notes: This Table reports the estimated coefficients and t-statistic in parentheses of Eq. (1) where rating downgrade (Panel I) 
and upgrade (Panel II) hazard for each of the three rating agencies: S&P, Moody’s and Fitch was estimated using Cox 
Proportional Hazard modelling technique. The dataset consists of episodes of rating trend reversals presented in Table 2. The 
dependent variable is the time that elapsed (in days) between 1/12000 (or a first day the rating was assigned if the sovereign 
was not rated before 1/12000) of a sovereign by the observed CRA (S&P Spec. 1-3; Moody’s Spec. 4-6; Fitch Spec. 7-9) and the 
first downgrade (upgrade) of that sovereign identified as a trend reversal episode. Downgraded (Upgraded) by S&P, Moody’s 
and Fitch are dummy variables equal to 1 from the day the CRA downgrades (upgrades) the sovereign in the given episode, 
and 0 otherwise. CRA rating is the sovereign rating level expressed in 20-notch rating scale assigned on the 1/1/2000 (or a first 
day the rating is assigned if the sovereign is not rated before 1/1/2000) by the given CRA. Control variables are defined in the 
main text. Significance levels are: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%. 
4.3 Commercial trap analyses 
The estimation results revealed by the Cox proportional hazard model discussed in the previous 
section substantiate the leadership role of S&P in detecting changes in sovereign credit quality. 
Although they provide positive signals to rating users about the timeliness of S&P’s sovereign 
ratings compared with Moody’s and Fitch, there remains an unanswered question about its 
implications for the first-mover CRA (S&P). In this section, we provide an empirical investigation 
into this issue. The full results are reported in Tables 5-13.  
Table 5. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis – Eq. (2) 
CONTRACT WITHDRAWAL   
 Whole sample Small borrower Large borrower 
Dependent variable Withdrawal Withdrawal Withdrawal Withdrawal Withdrawal Withdrawal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Downgrade 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.002 0.003 
 (2.59) (2.95) (4.23) (4.49) (0.09) (0.15) 
Leader -0.045 -0.049 -0.015 -0.020 -0.106 -0.110 
 (-1.26) (-1.39) (-0.42) (-0.56) (-1.40) (-1.47) 
Constant -0.000 -0.029*** -0.000 -0.019*** 0.000 -0.030*** 
 (-0.00) (-23.03) (-0.00) (-14.88) (0.00) (-12.39) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 787651 787651 523312 523312 264339 264339 
Adjusted r-squared 0.061 0.067 0.028 0.034 0.176 0.179 
Notes: This Table reports estimated coefficients and t-statistic in parentheses of Eq. (2) using OLS modelling approach (Section 
4.3). The dataset consists of a panel of S&P rated sovereigns between January 2000 and February 2019 (Whole sample). Small 
(large) borrower relates to a sovereign with less than (more than) $100 billion of sovereign debt outstanding in 2018. 
Dependent variable is contract withdrawal dummy variable (this also consists of solicitation status switch from solicited to 
unsolicited). This variable is available throughout the sample period January 2000-February 2019. Significance levels are: *** 
p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
 
Table 5 reports the estimation results of Eq. (2) implemented on the full sample of sovereign 
entities rated by S&P as well as on two subsamples of small sovereign borrowers and large 
sovereign borrowers (rated by S&P). Large sovereign borrowers are frequent issuers of debt 
instruments on the capital market. Among these large borrowers include United States, United 
Kingdom, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, India, Italy, Portugal, Russia, 
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Spain, South Korea. We repeat these subsample analyses for three different geographical 
regions in Table 6, including EMEA, Americas and Asia Pacific. 
Table 5 displays the coefficient estimates and their corresponding t-values in parentheses for 
Eq. (2). For each sample (the full sample and two subsamples), we run the Eq. (2) with year 
fixed effects in specification 1 and with year-region fixed effects in specification 2. Consistent 
with our prediction, a sovereign downgrade in a given year by the first-mover CRA (S&P) results 
in a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of contracts being cancelled. The 
coefficient estimates on Downgrade take the correct signs for the full sample and for small 
sovereign borrowers, while turn insignificant for large borrowers. On average, one notch 
downgrade by S&P increases the probability of contract within three years by approximately 
2.4% (Table 5, Column 2). More contracts are lost due to cancellation by small sovereign 
borrowers than by large borrowers. Specifically, small borrowers are more likely to cancel 
contract within three years of a notch downgrade by 3.3% relative to a benchmark case of no 
rating change (Table 5, Column 4). Though small in magnitudes, our estimates are economically 
meaningful because contract cancellation is a rare event.  
Table 6. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis – Eq. (2)- Regional breakdown 
CONTRACT WITHDRAWAL  
 EMEA Americas Asia Pacific 
Dependent variable Withdrawal Withdrawal Withdrawal Withdrawal Withdrawal Withdrawal 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Downgrade 0.020* 0.020* 0.025*** 0.025*** -0.011 -0.011 
 (1.67) (1.67) (3.28) (3.28) (-0.32) (-0.32) 
Leader -0.049 -0.049 -0.046 -0.046 -0.013 -0.013 
 (-1.09) (-1.09) (-0.87) (-0.87) (-0.08) (-0.08) 
Constant 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 456528 456528 190830 190830 140293 140293 
Adjusted r-squared 0.057 0.057 0.038 0.038 0.152 0.152 
Notes: This Table reports estimated coefficients and t-statistic in parentheses of Eq. (2) using OLS modelling approach (Section 
4.3). The dataset consists of a panel of S&P rated sovereigns between January 2000 and February 2019. Regions according to 
World Bank definition include Europe, Middle East, Central Asia (EMEA), Americas, and Asia Pacific. The dependent variable is 
contract withdrawal dummy variable (this also consists of solicitation status switch from solicited to unsolicited). Spec. (2) 
yields the same results as Spec. (1) as regional dummies are dropped due to collinearity. Significance levels are: *** p<1%, ** 
p<5%, * p<10. 
 
In Table 6, we run Eq. (2) on three subsamples corresponding to three geographical regions in 
our dataset, including EMEA, Americas and Asia Pacific. Consistent with Table 1 in which S&P 
leadership in downgrade episodes are more pronounced in EMEA and Americas, here we find 
that Downgrade is statistically significant with correct sign in EMEA (2.0%) and Americas (2.5%), 
but insignificant in Asia Pacific (1.1%). The results reveal a heterogeneity in the impact of 
sovereign downgrades by S&P’s on their future loss of rating contracts. The commercial loss is 
most severe in countries where S&P downgrades fastest. For both full sample analysis and the 
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subsample analyses, we do not find specific evidence for Leader in case of contract withdrawals 
in Table 5 and Table 6.15 
Table 7. Summary statistics of S&P’s relative sovereign rating coverage, market share and 
downgrade intensity 
Variables N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
S&P/Moody’s coverage 
ratio  
51 1.01 0.11 0.87 1.26 
S&P/Fitch coverage ratio  51 1.24 0.13 1.03 1.47 
S&P’s region market share 51 0.85 0.06 0.76 0.96 
S&P/Moody’s coverage 
ratio – Americas  
17 0.95 0.05 0.87 1.00 
S&P/Moody’s coverage 
ratio – Asia Pacific 
17 0.98 0.07 0.88 1.05 
S&P/Moody’s coverage 
ratio – EMEA 
17 1.10 0.12 0.91 1.26 
S&P/Fitch coverage ratio – 
Americas 
17 1.37 0.06 1.24 1.47 
S&P/Fitch coverage ratio – 
Asia Pacific 
17 1.23 0.12 1.05 1.38 
S&P/Fitch coverage ratio – 
EMEA 
17 1.12 0.06 1.03 1.20 
S&P’s region market share 
- Americas 
17 0.82 0.02 0.76 0.84 
S&P’s region market share 
– Asia Pacific 
17 0.91 0.05 0.84 0.96 
S&P’s region market share 
- EMEA 
17 0.82 0.03 0.77 0.86 
S&P’s downgrade intensity 612 0.51 1.05 0 9 
S&P’s downgrade intensity 
– small borrowers 
612 0.37 0.84 0 7 
S&P’s downgrade intensity 
– big borrowers 
612 0.14 0.43 0 5 
S&P’s first-mover 
downgrade intensity 
612 0.06 0.28 0 4 
S&P’s first-mover 
downgrade intensity – 
small borrowers 
612 0.06 0.27 0 4 
S&P’s first-mover 
downgrade intensity – big 
borrowers 
612 0.03 0.17 0 2 
Notes: This table summarises S&P’s annual region market shares, annual their ratios of sovereign rating coverage compared 
with Moody’s and Fitch and S&P’s monthly downgrade intensity. The calculation of the rating coverage ratios, market shares 
and downgrade intensity is explained in Section 3.3. 
 
 
15 There is a possibility that a contract cancellation is motivated by the sovereign’s domestic economic conditions 
or by the sovereign’s dissatisfaction with the initial rating level rather than by the CRA’s downgrade actions, we 
control for this by adding government budget balance (as percentage of GDP), GDP per capita and initial sovereign 
credit rating level to Eq. (2) and re-estimate it on both full sample and all the samples. Our results are mostly 
unchanged.  
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Turning to the examination of relative sovereign rating coverage and market share, we 
summarise S&P’s relative sovereign rating coverage, region market share and sovereign 
downgrade intensity in Table 7. Since RSC are forwarded by three years relative to the year of 
the rating observation, we lose the first three years of RSC (2000, 2001 and 2002). By the end 
of our sample period (January 2019), S&P rated 127 countries. Throughout the 17-year period, 
on average, they rate about 120 countries per year on a global scale, more than both Moody’s 
(116) and Fitch (101). S&P’s annual average market share across three regions is 85% with a 
small standard deviation of only 6%.  In comparison with both Moody’s and Fitch, S&P tends to 
own a larger pool of sovereign clients. The average ratio of S&P’s sovereign rating coverage to 
Moody’s (Fitch) is greater than one. Looking into each region, we find S&P dominates Fitch in 
all the three regions, while become slightly less competitive than Moody’s (smaller rating 
coverage) in Americas and Asia Pacific. With regards to downgrade intensity, S&P makes an 
average of 0.51 downgrade per region per month with standard deviation of 1.05. 
Nevertheless, they can announce up to nine downgrades within a month. Small sovereign 
borrowers (0.37 downgrades per region per month) are more vulnerable to S&P’s downgrades 
than large borrowers (0.14 downgrades per region per month). They are also more prone to 
S&P’s first-mover downgrades than large sovereign borrowers.  
Table 8. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis – Eq. (3) 
MARKET SHARE   















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Downgrade 
-0.010*** -0.009*** 0.005 -0.002 
-
0.007*** -0.002** 
 (-2.65) (-3.47) (1.02) (-1.08) (-4.17) (-2.01) 
Leader 0.011 -0.013 -0.044** -0.006 -0.009 -0.003 
 (0.71) (-1.12) (-2.10) (-0.68) (-1.17) (-0.84) 
Constant 
0.993*** 0.913*** 1.222*** 1.387*** 0.825*** 
0.805**
* 
 (1.88) (2.30) (1.81) (4.31) (3.43) (5.89) 
Year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed 
effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 689065 689065 689065 689065 689065 689065 
Adjusted r-
squared 0.381 0.694 0.153 0.830 0.246 0.786 
Notes: This Table reports estimated coefficients and t-statistic in parentheses of Eq. (3) using OLS modelling approach (Section 
4.3). The dataset consists of a panel of S&P rated sovereigns between January 2000 and February 2019. Dependent variable 
S&P vs. Moody’s (S&P vs. Fitch) is the ratio of S&P’s to Moody’s (Fitch’s) annual sovereign rating coverage in each of the three 
regions including EMEA, Americas and Asia Pacific. The dependent variable S&P vs. Global refers to the S&P’s annual region 
market share defined by the number of sovereigns rated by S&P as percentage of all sovereigns rated by any three global CRAs 
in a year. Significance levels are: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
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The estimation results of Eq. (3) are presented for the full sample of all sovereigns rated by S&P 
in Table 8, the subsample of small and large borrowers in Tables 9 and 10 respectively. Table 8 
reveals the empirical evidence for our prediction that S&P’s sovereign downgrades might 
endanger their market share. The first (second) two columns show the impact of downgrades 
on S&P’s sovereign rating coverage relative to Moody’s (Fitch) three years later. The last two 
columns show the impact of S&P’s downgrades on their overall regional market shares. The 
results support our earlier prediction. For each one-notch downgrade, the overall regional 
market share declines by approximately 0.2% within three years after the downgrade occurs 
(Table 8, column 6). We notice that the loss of market power relative to Moody’s is much 
stronger than the loss to Fitch. For example, for a three-notch downgrade, S&P’s relative 
sovereign rating coverage declines by 2.7% (0.9%*3) (Table 7, Column 2). This value is 
equivalent to a decline in S&P’s annual average relative sovereign rating coverage (compared 
with Moody’s) across three regions from 1.01 to 0.98, and a loss of 1.05 sovereign customers.16  
Table 9. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis– Eq. (3) - Small Borrowers  
MARKET SHARE   















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Downgrade 




 (-2.59) (-3.00) (0.58) (-1.87) (-3.37) (-2.02) 
Leader 0.002 -0.021 -0.059** -0.018 -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.09) (-1.43) (-2.19) (-1.64) (-1.18) (-1.52) 
Constant 





 (1.36) (1.65) (1.30) (3.41) (2.96) (4.62) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed 
effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 454470 454470 454470 454470 454470 454470 
Adjusted r-squared 0.365 0.662 0.119 0.849 0.280 0.733 
Notes: This Table reports estimated coefficients and t-statistic in parentheses of Eq. (3) using OLS modelling approach (Section 
4.3). The dataset consists of a panel of S&P rated sovereigns between January 2000 and February 2019. Small borrower relates 
to a sovereign with less than $100 billion of sovereign debt outstanding in 2018. Dependent variable S&P vs. Moody’s (S&P vs. 
Fitch) is the ratio of S&P’s to Moody’s (Fitch’s) annual sovereign rating coverage in each of the three regions including EMEA, 
Americas and Asia Pacific. The dependent variable S&P vs. Global refers to the S&P’s annual region market share defined by 
the number of sovereigns rated by S&P as percentage of all sovereigns rated by any three global CRAs in a year. Significance 




16 Average number of S&P’s sovereign clients lost as a result of a three-notch downgrade is equal to 2.7% multiplied 
by 39 (Moody’s annual average regional sovereign rating coverage across three regions). 
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Similar to the contract withdrawal analyses, we obtain strongly statistically significant 
coefficients on Downgrade in the subsample of small sovereign borrowers (Table 9), but small 
and statistically insignificant coefficients on Downgrade for large sovereign borrowers (Table 
10). The results are consistent with Eq. (2) for contract withdrawal. Small sovereign borrowers 
are more likely than large sovereign borrowers to cancel contracts as a result of the 
downgrades, thus adversely affecting S&P’s rating coverage relative to their major competitor 
(Moody’s in particular).     
Table 10. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis- – Eq. (3) - Large Borrowers  
MARKET SHARE   















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Downgrade 




 (-0.98) (-1.80) (1.02) (1.09) (-1.96) (-0.65) 
Leader 0.031 0.004 -0.014 0.015 -0.010 0.004 
 (1.14) (0.23) (-0.45) (0.93) (-0.68) (0.64) 
Constant 
1.002*** 0.914*** 1.210*** 1.380*** 
0.839*
** 0.804*** 
 (1.32) (1.65) (1.35) (2.67) (2.00) (3.71) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed 
effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 234595 234595 234595 234595 234595 234595 
Adjusted r-squared 0.425 0.765 0.256 0.812 0.244 0.845 
Notes: This Table reports estimated coefficients and t-statistic in parentheses of Eq. (3) using OLS modelling approach (Section 
4.3). The dataset consists of a panel of S&P rated sovereigns between January 2000 and February 2019. Large borrower relates 
to a sovereign with more than $100 billion of sovereign debt outstanding in 2018. Dependent variable S&P vs. Moody’s (S&P 
vs. Fitch) is the ratio of S&P’s to Moody’s (Fitch’s) annual sovereign rating coverage in each of the three regions including EMEA, 
Americas and Asia Pacific. The dependent variable S&P vs. Global refers to the S&P’s annual region market share defined by 
the number of sovereigns rated by S&P as percentage of all sovereigns rated by any three global CRAs in a year. Significance 
levels are: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
 
 
In Tables 11-13, we present the estimation results of Eq. (4). In Table 11, we regress RSC on 
S&P’s downgrade intensity and first-mover downgrade intensity. We control the model for year 
fixed effects or region-year fixed effects. The sample consists of 612 region-month observations 
for which market shares and ratios of sovereign rating coverage are available. We run Eq. (4) 
on two versions of RSC. In columns S&P vs. Moody’s (vs. Fitch), we measure RSC by the ratios 
of S&P sovereign rating coverage to Moody’s (Fitch’s) sovereign rating coverage. In column S&P 
vs. Global, RSC is the S&P’s annual region market share. We notice a sharp increase in adjusted 
R-squared when the models are controlled by both region fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
With the inclusion of region dummies and year dummies, our model explains up to 78.4% of 
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the variation in dependent variables. We find a statistically significant coefficient on 
DownIntensity in the case of S&P’s sovereign rating coverage relative to Moody’s. The 
coefficient is strongly significant at 1% level and has the correct sign. For each additional 
downgrade made by S&P, the ratio of S&P to Moody’s rating coverage drops by 1.2% in the 
following three years. We do not find similar evidence in the case of S&P versus Fitch nor for 
S&P’s versus the Global17 sample. The result corroborates our earlier finding regarding the 
potential decline of S&P’s sovereign rating coverage relative to Moody’s.  
Table 11. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis – Eq. (4) 
MARKET SHARE: DOWNGRADES INTENSITY  
 Whole sample 












 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Downgrade Intensity 




 (1.44) (-3.84) (-3.00) (-0.05) (-5.41) (-1.29) 
First-mover Downgrade 
Intensity 0.008 -0.006 -0.030 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.50) (-0.57) (-1.49) (-0.64) (-0.02) (-0.51) 
Constant 





 (62.11) (80.53) (64.78) (125.11) (98.16) (171.40) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 612 612 612 612 612 612 
Adjusted r-squared 0.204 0.625 0.169 0.760 0.198 0.784 
Notes: This Table reports estimated coefficients and t-statistic in parentheses of Eq. (4) using OLS modelling approach (Section 
4.3). The dataset consists of a panel of S&P rated sovereigns between January 2000 and February 2019. Dependent variable 
S&P vs. Moody’s (S&P vs. Fitch) is the ratio of S&P’s to Moody’s (Fitch’s) annual sovereign rating coverage in each of the three 
regions including EMEA, Americas and Asia Pacific. The dependent variable S&P vs. Global refers to the S&P’s annual region 
market share defined by the number of sovereigns rated by S&P as percentage of all sovereigns rated by any three global CRAs 
in a year. Significance levels are: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
 
In Tables 12-13, we redefine the RHS variables and re-estimate Eq. (4). Specifically, we count 
S&P’s downgrades and S&P’s first-mover downgrades on small sovereign borrowers in Table 
12 and on large sovereign borrowers in Table 13. We find strong evidence in favour of the 
commercial trap hypothesis in the case of small sovereign borrowers, and weaker evidence in 
the case of large sovereign borrowers. Both tables highlight the significant decrease in S&P’s 
sovereign rating coverage relative to Moody’s.  
 
17 Global refers to the S&P’s annual region market share defined by the number of sovereigns rated by S&P as 
percentage of all sovereigns rated by any three global CRAs in a year 
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Table 12. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis- Eq. (4) - Small Borrowers  
MARKET SHARE: DOWNGRADES INTENSITY  
 Small Borrower 

















** -0.002 -0.016*** -0.002 
 (1.56) (-3.67) (-3.26) (-0.61) (-5.47) (-1.11) 
First-mover Downgrade 
Intensity -0.000 -0.004 -0.008 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 




** 1.406*** 0.835*** 0.799*** 
 (62.18) (80.33) (64.49) (125.14) (98.38) (171.41) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 612 612 612 612 612 612 
Adjusted r-squared 0.203 0.623 0.163 0.760 0.201 0.784 
Notes: This Table reports estimated coefficients and t-statistic in parentheses of Eq. (3) using OLS modelling approach (Section 
4.3). The dataset consists of a panel of S&P rated sovereigns between January 2000 and February 2019. Small borrower relates 
to a sovereign with less than $100 billion of sovereign debt outstanding in 2018. Dependent variable S&P vs. Moody’s (S&P vs. 
Fitch) is the ratio of S&P’s to Moody’s (Fitch’s) annual sovereign rating coverage in each of the three regions including EMEA, 
Americas and Asia Pacific. The dependent variable S&P vs. Global refers to the S&P’s annual region market share defined by 
the number of sovereigns rated by S&P as percentage of all sovereigns rated by any three global CRAs in a year. Significance 
levels are: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. Significance levels are: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
 
 
In summary, our empirical investigation reveals a potentially important insight into the 
commercial aspect of the lead-lag relationship in sovereign credit ratings which prior papers 
fail to provide. Although the revealed results do not necessarily imply that there is a violation 
of the analytical independence principle in the production of sovereign credit ratings by issuer-
pay CRAs, they highlight the important role of maintaining effective Chinese walls to prevent 
commercial motivations from interfering with analysts’ sovereign credit assessments.18 It 
stresses the importance, that analysts are not subjected to any pressure, however subtly or 




18 Using revenues earned on ancillary non-rating services, Baghai and Becker (2017) show that there is a 
commercial interest that results in biased assessments of corporate credit risk in issuer-pay CRAs, which leads to 
overly high credit ratings and poor ex-post rating performance. 
FIRST-MOVER DISADVANTAGE: THE SOVEREIGN RATINGS MOUSETRAP | 33 
 
Table 13. Commercial mouse trap hypothesis- Eq. (4) - Large Borrowers  
MARKET SHARE: DOWNGRADES INTENSITY  
 Large Borrower 












 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Downgrade Intensity 0.009 -0.014* -0.022 0.004 -0.011* -0.003 
 (0.78) (-1.75) (-1.59) (0.56) (-1.80) (-0.81) 
First-mover 
Downgrade Intensity 0.007 -0.010 -0.026 -0.004 -0.005 0.0004 
 (0.26) (-0.53) (-0.75) (-0.22) (-0.33) (0.06) 
Constant 0.976*** 0.917*** 1.281*** 1.405*** 0.834*** 0.799*** 
 (62.02) (79.49) (63.97) (125.07) (95.51) (171.06) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 612 612 612 612 612 612 
Adjusted r-squared 0.200 0.615 0.150 0.760 0.154 0.783 
Notes: This Table reports estimated coefficients and t-statistic in parentheses of Eq. (3) using OLS modelling approach (Section 
4.3). The dataset consists of a panel of S&P rated sovereigns between January 2000 and February 2019. Large borrower relates 
to a sovereign with more than $100 billion of sovereign debt outstanding in 2018. Dependent variable S&P vs. Moody’s (S&P 
vs. Fitch) is the ratio of S&P’s to Moody’s (Fitch’s) annual sovereign rating coverage in each of the three regions including EMEA, 
Americas and Asia Pacific. The dependent variable S&P vs. Global refers to the S&P’s annual region market share defined by 
the number of sovereigns rated by S&P as percentage of all sovereigns rated by any three global CRAs in a year. Significance 
levels are: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper we document that S&P tends to be the first mover in taking sovereign actions, 
particularly negative rating actions. We show that being a first mover in downgrading sovereign 
ratings has negative commercial implications for the first-mover CRA (S&P). Using a sample of 
102 sovereigns rated by three largest CRAs, including S&P, Moody’s and Fitch between January 
2000 and January 2019, we are the first study to show that the CRA making the timeliest 
downgrades receives a penalty in the form of contract withdrawals and a decrease in relative 
sovereign rating coverage. Although the S&P is the quickest to respond to the new information 
released to the market, which enhances the relevance and timeliness for investors, it may be 
penalised for its prompt actions by sovereign clients who might decide to cancel their business 
with S&P following a downgrade. 
Our identification strategy relies on observing the direction of the rating changes (trend 
reversals) rather than their intensity, which enables us to identify which CRA is the quickest to 
incorporate the new information from the market into sovereign ratings before it becomes a 
consensus view. 
Using the Cox proportional hazard model, we establish that S&P is the first mover in both 
sovereign rating upgrades and sovereign rating downgrades. Furthermore, we find that the 
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propensity for S&P to lose contracts rises by 2.4% with each one-notch downgrade announced 
by them. The more regular the downgrades occur, the more likely it is that S&P’s sovereign 
rating coverage relative to their major rival CRA (Moody’s) would decline, hence adversely 
affecting S&P’s competitiveness. There is a potential trade-off for analysts to release timely 
downgrades, on the one hand, and to minimise perceived threats to their personal job security 
on the other if the rating action jeopardises sovereign rating contracts. Considering on top of 
that the disproportional importance of sovereign ratings for the rest of the economy, special 
attention needs to be given to protecting the independence of sovereign analysts. Our results 
should be of interest not only to the CRAs’ own compliance departments, but also to regulators, 
policymakers and investors, who are the ultimate users of sovereign ratings. 
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Appendix 
Table A 1. Episodes of rating trend reversals 
ANEL I: UPGRADES          













Angola EMEA Upgrade 12-Jul-11 03-Jun-11 24-May-11 49 10 0 3rd 2nd 1st no 
Argentina Americas Upgrade 06-May-16 15-Apr-16 10-May-16 21 0 25 2nd 1st 3rd yes 
Azerbaijan EMEA Upgrade 23-Dec-11 19-Apr-12 20-May-10 582 700 0 2nd 3rd 1st no 
Bahrain EMEA Upgrade 06-Apr-06 15-Aug-02 10-Jan-03 1330 0 148 3rd 1st 2nd no 
Belarus EMEA Upgrade 10-Jun-17 16-Mar-18 26-Jan-18 0 279 230 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Bolivia Americas Upgrade 06-May-10 28-Sep-09 08-Sep-09 240 20 0 3rd 2nd 1st no 
Brazil Americas Upgrade 03-Jan-01 16-Oct-00 22-Feb-00 316 237 0 3rd 2nd 1st yes 
Brazil Americas Upgrade 17-Sep-04 09-Sep-04 06-Nov-03 316 308 0 3rd 2nd 1st yes 
Bulgaria EMEA Upgrade 10-May-00 19-Dec-01 14-Jan-02 0 588 614 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Chile Americas Upgrade 14-Jan-04 07-Jul-06 28-Mar-05 0 905 439 1st 3rd 2nd no 
China 
Asia & 
Pacific Upgrade 17-Feb-04 15-Oct-03 17-Oct-05 125 0 733 2nd 1st 3rd yes 
Colombia Americas Upgrade 05-Mar-07 19-Jun-08 21-Jun-07 0 472 108 1st 3rd 2nd yes 
Cyprus EMEA Upgrade 24-Apr-08 10-Jul-07 12-Jul-07 289 0 2 3rd 1st 2nd no 
Cyprus EMEA Upgrade 03-Jul-13 14-Nov-14 23-Oct-15 0 499 842 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Dominican 
Republic Americas Upgrade 29-Jun-05 02-May-07 19-Jul-05 0 672 20 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Ecuador Americas Upgrade 24-Jan-05 24-Feb-04 07-Oct-04 335 0 226 3rd 1st 2nd no 
Ecuador Americas Upgrade 15-Jun-09 24-Sep-09 04-Sep-09 0 101 81 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Egypt EMEA Upgrade 15-Nov-13 07-Apr-15 19-Dec-14 0 508 399 1st 3rd 2nd yes 
El Salvador Americas Upgrade 03-Oct-17 23-Feb-18 06-Oct-17 0 143 3 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Estonia EMEA Upgrade 20-Nov-01 12-Nov-02 28-Sep-00 418 775 0 2nd 3rd 1st no 
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Greece EMEA Upgrade 18-Dec-12 29-Nov-13 14-May-13 0 346 147 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Greece EMEA Upgrade 21-Jul-15 23-Jun-17 18-Aug-17 0 703 759 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Greece EMEA Upgrade 13-Mar-01 04-Nov-02 27-Jul-00 229 830 0 2nd 3rd 1st no 
Hong Kong 
Asia & 
Pacific Upgrade 08-Feb-01 15-Oct-03 25-Jun-01 0 979 137 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Hungary EMEA Upgrade 02-Feb-00 14-Nov-00 30-Nov-00 0 286 302 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Hungary EMEA Upgrade 20-Mar-15 04-Nov-16 20-May-16 0 595 427 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Iceland EMEA Upgrade 17-Jul-15 29-Jun-15 17-Feb-12 1246 1228 0 3rd 2nd 1st no 
India 
Asia & 
Pacific Upgrade 02-Feb-05 03-Feb-03 21-Jan-04 730 0 352 3rd 1st 2nd yes 
Indonesia 
Asia & 
Pacific Upgrade 19-May-17 13-Apr-18 20-Dec-17 0 329 215 1st 3rd 2nd yes 
Indonesia 
Asia & 
Pacific Upgrade 05-Sep-02 29-Sep-03 01-Aug-02 35 424 0 2nd 3rd 1st yes 
Ireland EMEA Upgrade 06-Jun-14 17-Jan-14 15-Aug-14 140 0 210 2nd 1st 3rd yes 
Israel EMEA Upgrade 27-Nov-07 17-Apr-08 11-Feb-08 0 142 76 1st 3rd 2nd yes 
Jamaica Americas Upgrade 24-Feb-10 02-Mar-10 16-Feb-10 8 14 0 2nd 3rd 1st no 
Kazakhstan EMEA Upgrade 28-Jul-00 07-Mar-01 12-Jul-01 0 222 349 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Kuwait EMEA Upgrade 04-Apr-02 15-May-02 12-Jun-01 296 337 0 2nd 3rd 1st no 
Latvia EMEA Upgrade 20-Aug-02 12-Nov-02 21-Jul-03 0 84 335 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Latvia EMEA Upgrade 07-Dec-10 15-Mar-13 15-Mar-11 0 829 98 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Lebanon EMEA Upgrade 05-Aug-08 01-Apr-09 31-Mar-10 0 239 603 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Lithuania EMEA Upgrade 11-Apr-14 08-May-15 05-Apr-13 371 763 0 2nd 3rd 1st no 
Lithuania EMEA Upgrade 22-Apr-02 12-Nov-02 16-May-01 341 545 0 2nd 3rd 1st no 
Malaysia 
Asia & 
Pacific Upgrade 19-Aug-02 17-Oct-00 07-Aug-02 671 0 659 3rd 1st 2nd yes 
Mexico Americas Upgrade 13-Mar-00 07-Mar-00 03-May-00 6 0 57 2nd 1st 3rd yes 
Panama Americas Upgrade 26-Feb-08 09-Jun-10 23-Mar-10 0 834 756 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Peru Americas Upgrade 08-Jun-04 16-Jul-07 18-Nov-04 0 1133 163 1st 3rd 2nd no 




Pacific Upgrade 12-Nov-10 23-Jul-09 23-Jun-11 477 0 700 2nd 1st 3rd yes 
Portugal EMEA Upgrade 18-Sep-15 09-May-14 15-Dec-17 497 0 1316 2nd 1st 3rd yes 
Romania EMEA Upgrade 07-Jun-01 19-Dec-01 16-Nov-00 203 398 0 2nd 3rd 1st no 
Russia EMEA Upgrade 08-Dec-00 13-Nov-00 08-May-00 214 189 0 3rd 2nd 1st yes 
Saudi Arabia EMEA Upgrade 05-Apr-06 14-Nov-05 17-Aug-06 142 0 276 2nd 1st 3rd yes 
Serbia EMEA Upgrade 15-Dec-17 17-Mar-17 17-Jun-16 546 273 0 3rd 2nd 1st no 
Slovak 
Republic EMEA Upgrade 30-Oct-01 13-Nov-01 01-Nov-02 0 14 367 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Slovenia EMEA Upgrade 16-Dec-16 23-Jan-15 23-Sep-16 693 0 609 3rd 1st 2nd no 
Slovenia EMEA Upgrade 26-Mar-03 14-Nov-00 06-May-03 862 0 903 2nd 1st 3rd no 
South Africa EMEA Upgrade 25-Feb-00 29-Nov-01 19-May-00 0 643 84 1st 3rd 2nd yes 
South Korea 
Asia & 
Pacific Upgrade 13-Nov-01 28-Mar-02 29-Mar-00 594 729 0 2nd 3rd 1st yes 
Spain EMEA Upgrade 23-May-14 21-Feb-14 25-Apr-14 91 0 63 3rd 1st 2nd yes 
Spain EMEA Upgrade 03-Dec-04 13-Dec-01 10-Dec-03 1086 0 727 3rd 1st 2nd yes 
Sweden EMEA Upgrade 16-Feb-04 04-Apr-02 04-Mar-02 714 31 0 3rd 2nd 1st yes 
Thailand 
Asia & 
Pacific Upgrade 08-Oct-03 22-Jun-00 03-Sep-03 1203 0 1168 3rd 1st 2nd yes 
Tunisia EMEA Upgrade 21-Mar-00 17-Apr-03 24-May-01 0 1122 429 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Turkey EMEA Upgrade 28-Jul-03 14-Dec-05 25-Sep-03 0 870 59 1st 3rd 2nd yes 
Ukraine EMEA Upgrade 19-Oct-15 19-Nov-15 18-Nov-15 0 31 30 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Ukraine EMEA Upgrade 20-Jul-04 24-Jan-02 26-Mar-02 908 0 61 3rd 1st 2nd no 
Uruguay Americas Upgrade 02-Jun-03 21-Dec-06 17-Jun-03 0 1298 15 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Venezuela Americas Upgrade 30-Jul-03 07-Sep-04 23-Jun-03 37 442 0 2nd 3rd 1st no 
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PANEL II: DOWNGRADES        













Angola EMEA Downgrade 13-Feb-15 29-Apr-16 25-Sep-15 0 441 224 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Argentina Americas Downgrade 14-Nov-00 28-Mar-01 20-Mar-01 0 134 126 1st 3rd 2nd yes 
Austria EMEA Downgrade 13-Jan-12 24-Jun-16 13-Feb-15 0 1624 1127 1st 3rd 2nd yes 
Azerbaijan EMEA Downgrade 29-Jan-16 05-Feb-16 26-Feb-16 0 7 28 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Bahrain EMEA Downgrade 21-Feb-11 23-Aug-10 03-Mar-11 182 0 192 2nd 1st 3rd no 
Belgium EMEA Downgrade 25-Nov-11 16-Dec-11 27-Jan-12 0 21 63 1st 2nd 3rd yes 
Bermuda Americas Downgrade 29-Dec-11 29-Apr-09 26-Jun-12 974 0 1154 2nd 1st 3rd no 
Brazil Americas Downgrade 29-Apr-03 12-Aug-02 20-Jun-02 313 53 0 3rd 2nd 1st yes 
Brazil Americas Downgrade 24-Mar-14 11-Aug-15 16-Dec-15 0 505 632 1st 2nd 3rd yes 
Costa Rica Americas Downgrade 25-Feb-16 16-Sep-14 19-Jan-17 527 0 856 2nd 1st 3rd no 
Croatia EMEA Downgrade 21-Dec-10 31-Jan-13 20-Sep-13 0 772 1004 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Cyprus EMEA Downgrade 16-Nov-10 24-Feb-11 31-May-11 0 100 196 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Dominican 
Republic Americas Downgrade 01-Oct-03 07-Oct-03 24-Oct-03 0 6 23 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Ecuador Americas Downgrade 20-Jun-05 30-Jan-07 23-Jan-07 0 589 582 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Egypt EMEA Downgrade 01-Feb-11 31-Jan-11 03-Feb-11 1 0 3 2nd 1st 3rd yes 
El Salvador Americas Downgrade 12-May-09 15-Nov-09 18-Jun-09 0 187 37 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Gabon EMEA Downgrade 13-Feb-15 29-Apr-16 08-May-15 0 441 84 1st 3rd 2nd no 
France EMEA Downgrade 13-Jan-12 19-Nov-12 12-Jul-13 0 311 546 1st 2nd 3rd yes 
Ghana EMEA Downgrade 24-Oct-14 27-Jun-14 17-Oct-13 372 253 0 3rd 2nd 1st no 
Greece EMEA Downgrade 06-Feb-15 29-Apr-15 27-Mar-15 0 82 49 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Greece EMEA Downgrade 17-Nov-04 22-Dec-09 16-Dec-04 0 1861 29 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Hungary EMEA Downgrade 15-Jun-06 22-Dec-06 06-Dec-05 191 381 0 2nd 3rd 1st no 
Iceland EMEA Downgrade 22-Dec-06 20-May-08 15-Mar-07 0 515 83 1st 3rd 2nd no 
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Ireland EMEA Downgrade 30-Mar-09 02-Jul-09 08-Apr-09 0 94 9 1st 3rd 2nd yes 
Jamaica Americas Downgrade 18-Mar-09 04-Mar-09 14-Jan-10 14 0 316 2nd 1st 3rd no 
Japan 
Asia & 
Pacific Downgrade 27-Jan-11 18-May-09 22-May-12 619 0 1100 2nd 1st 3rd yes 
Kazakhstan EMEA Downgrade 09-Feb-15 22-Apr-16 29-Apr-16 0 438 445 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Latvia EMEA Downgrade 17-May-07 07-Nov-08 17-Aug-07 0 540 92 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Lebanon EMEA Downgrade 18-Sep-00 30-Jul-01 02-Feb-01 0 315 137 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Lebanon EMEA Downgrade 01-Nov-13 16-Dec-14 14-Jul-16 0 410 986 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Lithuania EMEA Downgrade 30-Jan-08 23-Apr-09 03-Oct-08 0 449 247 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Malta EMEA Downgrade 13-Jan-12 06-Sep-11 20-Sep-13 129 0 745 2nd 1st 3rd no 
Mongolia 
Asia & 
Pacific Downgrade 29-Apr-14 17-Jul-14 24-Nov-15 0 79 574 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Mozambique EMEA Downgrade 14-Feb-14 07-Aug-15 30-Oct-15 0 539 623 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Nigeria EMEA Downgrade 20-Mar-15 29-Apr-16 23-Jun-16 0 406 461 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Philippines 
Asia & 
Pacific Downgrade 24-Apr-03 26-Jan-04 12-Jun-03 0 277 49 1st 3rd 2nd yes 
Oman EMEA Downgrade 12-May-17 28-Jul-17 11-Dec-17 0 77 213 1st 2nd 3rd no 
Portugal EMEA Downgrade 01-Nov-05 13-Jul-10 24-Mar-10 0 1715 1604 1st 3rd 2nd yes 
Qatar EMEA Downgrade 07-Jun-17 26-May-17 28-Aug-17 12 0 94 2nd 1st 3rd no 
Republic of 
Congo EMEA Downgrade 05-Feb-16 04-Mar-16 04-Mar-16 0 28 28 1st 2nd 2nd no 
Russia EMEA Downgrade 25-Apr-14 17-Oct-14 09-Jan-15 0 175 259 1st 2nd 3rd yes 
Saudi Arabia EMEA Downgrade 30-Oct-15 14-May-16 12-Apr-16 0 197 165 1st 3rd 2nd yes 
Slovenia EMEA Downgrade 19-Oct-11 22-Sep-11 28-Sep-11 27 0 6 3rd 1st 2nd no 
South Africa EMEA Downgrade 12-Oct-12 27-Sep-12 10-Jan-13 15 0 105 2nd 1st 3rd yes 
Spain EMEA Downgrade 19-Jan-09 30-Sep-10 28-May-10 0 619 494 1st 3rd 2nd yes 
Suriname Americas Downgrade 25-Apr-16 20-May-16 26-Feb-16 59 84 0 2nd 3rd 1st no 
Tunisia EMEA Downgrade 16-Mar-11 19-Jan-11 02-Mar-11 56 0 42 3rd 1st 2nd no 
Turkey EMEA Downgrade 20-Jul-16 23-Sep-16 27-Jan-17 0 65 191 1st 2nd 3rd yes 
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Ukraine EMEA Downgrade 12-Jun-08 12-May-09 17-Oct-08 0 334 127 1st 3rd 2nd no 
United 
Kingdom EMEA Downgrade 27-Jun-16 22-Feb-13 19-Apr-13 1221 0 56 3rd 1st 2nd yes 
Uruguay Americas Downgrade 14-Feb-02 03-May-02 13-Mar-02 0 78 27 1st 3rd 2nd no 
Venezuela Americas Downgrade 19-Aug-11 16-Dec-13 16-Dec-08 976 1826 0 2nd 3rd 1st no 
Venezuela Americas Downgrade 13-Dec-02 20-Sep-02 06-Feb-02 310 226 0 3rd 2nd 1st no 
Vietnam 
Asia & 
Pacific Downgrade 23-Dec-10 15-Dec-10 28-Jul-10 148 140 0 3rd 2nd 1st no 
Zambia EMEA Downgrade 01-Jul-15 25-Sep-15 28-Oct-13 611 697 0 2nd 3rd 1st no 
Notes: This Table presents 120 episodes of credit trend reversals for 73 countries rated by three biggest CRAs between January 2000 and February 2019. Panel I includes 65 upgrade episodes whereas 
Panel II includes 55 downgrade episodes. 
 
Table A 2. Episodes of Rising Stars and Fallen Angels 
  
PANEL I: RISING STARS       
Country Region Direction S&P date Moody 
date 






S&P rank Moody’s 
rank 
Fitch rank 
Azerbaijan EMEA Rising star 23-Dec-11 19-Apr-12 20-May-10 582 700 0 2nd 3rd 1st 
Brazil Americas Rising star 30-Apr-08 22-Sep-09 29-May-08 0 510 29 1st 3rd 2nd 
Bulgaria EMEA Rising star 24-Jun-04 01-Mar-06 04-Aug-04 0 615 41 1st 3rd 2nd 
Colombia Americas Rising star 16-Mar-11 31-May-11 22-Jun-11 0 76 98 1st 2nd 3rd 
Hungary EMEA Rising star 16-Sep-16 04-Nov-16 20-May-16 119 168 0 2nd 3rd 1st 
India 
Asia & 
Pacific Rising star 30-Jan-07 22-Jan-04 01-Aug-06 1104 0 922 3rd 1st 2nd 
Kazakhstan EMEA Rising star 20-May-04 19-Sep-02 27-Oct-04 609 0 769 2nd 1st 3rd 
Mexico Americas Rising star 07-Feb-02 07-Mar-00 15-Jan-02 702 0 679 3rd 1st 2nd 
Panama Americas Rising star 25-May-10 09-Jun-10 23-Mar-10 63 78 0 2nd 3rd 1st 
Peru Americas Rising star 14-Jul-08 16-Dec-09 02-Apr-08 103 623 0 2nd 3rd 1st 




Pacific Rising star 02-May-13 02-Oct-13 27-Mar-13 36 189 0 2nd 3rd 1st 
Romania EMEA Rising star 01-Nov-05 06-Oct-06 17-Nov-04 349 688 0 2nd 3rd 1st 
Russia EMEA Rising star 31-Jan-05 08-Oct-03 18-Nov-04 481 0 407 3rd 1st 2nd 
Slovak 
Republic EMEA Rising star 30-Oct-01 13-Nov-01 01-Nov-02 0 14 367 1st 2nd 3rd 
Uruguay Americas Rising star 03-Apr-12 31-Jul-12 07-Mar-13 0 119 338 1st 2nd 3rd 
PANEL II: FALLEN ANGELS        














Azerbaijan EMEA Fallen angel 29-Jan-16 05-Feb-16 26-Feb-16 0 7 28 1st 2nd 3rd 
Bahrain EMEA Fallen angel 17-Feb-16 04-Mar-16 28-Jun-16 0 16 132 1st 2nd 3rd 
Brazil Americas Fallen angel 09-Sep-15 24-Feb-16 16-Dec-15 0 168 98 1st 3rd 2nd 
Croatia EMEA Fallen angel 14-Dec-12 31-Jan-13 20-Sep-13 0 48 280 1st 2nd 3rd 
Cyprus EMEA Fallen angel 13-Jan-12 13-Mar-12 25-Jun-12 0 60 164 1st 2nd 3rd 
Greece EMEA Fallen angel 27-Apr-10 14-Jun-10 14-Jan-11 0 48 262 1st 2nd 3rd 
Hungary EMEA Fallen angel 21-Dec-11 24-Nov-11 06-Jan-12 27 0 43 2nd 1st 3rd 
Portugal EMEA Fallen angel 13-Jan-12 05-Jul-11 24-Nov-11 192 0 142 3rd 1st 2nd 
Tunisia EMEA Fallen angel 23-May-12 28-Feb-13 12-Dec-12 0 281 203 1st 3rd 2nd 
Uruguay Americas Fallen angel 14-Feb-02 03-May-02 13-Mar-02 0 78 27 1st 3rd 2nd 
Notes: This Table lists 25 episodes in which an investment-speculative grade boundary (BBB-/Baa3 – BB+/Ba1) has been crossed. Namely, Panel I lists episodes when sovereigns have been uplifted 
from a junk status to an investment grade (Rising stars), whereas Panel II lists episodes when sovereigns were downgraded from an investment grade to a junk status (Fallen angels). 
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